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This thesis reviewed and measured the methods employed by multinational U.S.-based 
technology firms to resist U.S. government surveillance. A political science adaptation of 
Affordance Theory was used to separate methods used to resist surveillance into four 
affordances: legal, political, technical, and market. Review of each firms’ actions provided a 
more granular evaluation of the motivations and impact of their choices than has been explored 
in existing literature. 
 
The results showed that firms had varying levels of success across all four affordances, 
and certainly less success than was assumed in existing literature given their resources and 
influence. The legal and political affordances were both constrained and enabled in part by the 
firms’ reliance on the U.S. government to compromise. The technical affordance was hampered 
by protection of data exploitative business models. The market affordance casted doubt on the 
ability of users to influence change via market pressures. The actions firms chose were heavily 
influenced by their surveillance capitalist business models predicated on mass collection and 
exploitation of user data. This reliance on personal data assets to drive revenue inhibited the 
firms’ capacity as surrogate defenders of individual privacy. When firms resisted surveillance, 
they were often motivated by conflict of law risks or protection of international markets. To 
effectively resist surveillance, current firms should begin to transition business models into new 
revenue streams and redirect public discontent to surveillance reform rather than surveillance 
resistance. New firms are at a disadvantaged position, with every option to resist surveillance 
being either cost prohibitive or with significant inherent risk.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
U.S.-based platform technology firms have established a market dominance built on the 
exploitation of personal data leveraged to create reinforcing network effects (Manjoo 2016). The 
global power and influence of these firms was supported by a largely unregulated free and open 
internet leading to a combined market capitalization in the trillions (Wilhelm 2017). Mass data 
collection drives the revenue of these firms, but the risks and responsibilities associated with the 
use of personal data threaten their business. In 2013, many of these firms were named as 
participants in clandestine surveillance operations executed by U.S. intelligence agencies (Welch 
2013). Implicated firms took several steps to mitigate the fallout from the disclosures to both 
correct the exaggerated interpretation of their involvement and demonstrate their public 
commitment to privacy. Despite these efforts, the previously global internet has since begun to 
establish borders. International markets are implementing protectionist data protection laws 
that restrict collection, storage, and transfer of their citizens’ personal information by firms. A 
bifurcated global internet increases operating burdens for firms and presents conflict of law 
scenarios that increase liability. U.S.-based firms can only hope to navigate and adapt to the 
emerging global trend that is national data protection. 
 
Exposure of U.S. government access to global personal data collected by U.S.-based firms 
initiated this newfound emphasis on digital sovereignty. While these firms are forced to find a 
balance between stakeholders, the U.S. government continues to defend its access on the 
grounds of national security prioritization. Firms have taken measures to resist U.S. government 
surveillance but have achieved mixed results despite their prominence. Presumably, globally 
dominant U.S.-based firms would have sufficient resources and influence to impact legislation 
and surveillance practices, but change has not come easily. Firms have succeeded on the 
margins. The U.S. government has allowed for more transparency in reporting and limited the 
use of non-disclosure orders. Recently enacted law provides processes for firms to refuse certain 
government data requests due to conflict of law situations in select countries (Daskal 2018). 
Encryption has prevented surveillance of data in-transit. However, more substantive limitations 
on U.S. government surveillance authorities have been thwarted, leading to many questions this 
thesis will address. Have firms simply tried and failed to more effectively resist surveillance? 
What methods have yielded preferred results? What limitations, if any, are holding firms back? 
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Existing literature takes three angles when evaluating the role of firms concerning 
privacy and surveillance. The first angle emphasizes the impact of firms on the surveillance 
environment which supports calls for a proportionate inclusion of firms within the broader 
surveillance conversation (Kumar 2016). Mass data collection and the replacement of 
traditionally surveilled communications mediums have elevated the value of firms when 
conducting U.S. government surveillance. This places firms in a unique position where their 
business models simultaneously enhance the government’s ability to conduct surveillance while 
enhancing their own abilities to limit that surveillance (Rozenshtein 2018). This private power 
afforded to firms to affect public operations creates positive and negative ripple effects for both 
U.S.-based firms and the U.S. government. The second angle is an ideological, privacy focused 
approach addressing surveillance resistance relative to the relationship between firms and 
individuals as both citizens and users. Privacy advocates expect firms to protect individual 
privacy by wielding the tremendous power and influence firms attained through the exploitation 
of personal data. This evaluation overvalues the ability of firms to resist surveillance, and when 
privacy is not protected, critics chastise firms for valuing business priorities over their users. 
The underlying expectation that firms are obligated to their users is too often framed with little 
consideration of other stakeholders. Again, privacy advocates emphasize the responsibility of 
firms to serve their users (Cover 2015) but they don’t consider how competing demands limit 
the firms’ ability to act as surrogate protectors of individual privacy. The third angle examines 
the structural reliance on firms to resist surveillance on behalf of users. Legal theory and 
precedent limit the rights of U.S. citizens to resist U.S. government surveillance when the 
government requests data directly from a firm. Individual citizens lack the resources, expertise, 
or collective action to leverage other forms of resistance, leaving them with little recourse to 
protect their own privacy (Calo 2015). At best users could use market pressure to force firms to 
implement privacy focused features (Soghoian 2015). If users wish to enhance their individual 
privacy, existing literature claims that success is dependent on the involvement of firms. 
 
This thesis aims to combine aspects of each existing literature angle into a more 
comprehensive evaluation of firm surveillance resistance. The surveillance resistance methods 
of firms have been reviewed in existing works and many of those covered will overlap with the 
methods reviewed in this thesis. The goal of this thesis is to review previously explored methods 
and build on existing findings using a more granular evaluation of those methods with 
consideration of competing stakeholder interests. Existing literature firmly established the 
pivotal role firms play in government surveillance due to their pervasiveness in everyday life. 
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This thesis confirms that surveillance capitalism has made firms into valuable tools of 
surveillance and formidable resistors of surveillance, but contends that the power and influence 
established through surveillance capitalism complicates the motivations of firms if and when 
they choose to resist surveillance. This thesis tests the efficacy of surveillance resistance 
methods through a closer lens by reviewing the detailed actions of firms within those methods 
and recording the end results. Reviewing specific actions of firms in depth revealed not only if 
firms could resist surveillance, but in what circumstances they chose to resist, what motivated 
them to resist, and to what degree their business models limited their resistance. Privacy 
advocates may expect firms to serve as third party protectors of individual privacy based on 
ideological and structural dependencies, but the findings of this thesis cast doubt on the mantle 
of firms as corporate gatekeepers. Often, surveillance resistance was motivated by the protection 
of foreign markets or inhibited by the dependence on exploiting personal data assets to drive 
revenue. Privacy advocates may interpret these findings as an abdication of the responsibility of 
firms to protect individual privacy, but that conclusion grossly oversimplifies the firms’ complex 
business environment. This thesis and existing literature acknowledge that firms are not devoid 
of privacy focused actions. Rather, this thesis emphasizes that the surveillance capitalist 
business models of firms create a dynamic of competing interests that complicate the perceived 
incentives, risks, and consequences of each action as interpreted by firms. 
 
To review and rate the efficacy of surveillance resistance methods, this thesis applies an 
adaptation of James Gibson’s Affordance Theory previously used by Ryan Calo to measure the 
ability of U.S. citizens when resisting surveillance. Calo segmented surveillance resistance into 
four affordances. The legal affordance covered litigious challenges. The political affordance 
covered appeals to lawmakers. The technical affordance covered privacy techniques like 
encryption. The market affordance covered the leveraging of external market forces to enhance 
resistance capabilities (Calo 2015, 6-15). Each affordance group will be rated after reviewing the 
methods and outcomes. By reviewing and rating the efforts U.S.-based firms have made to resist 
U.S. government surveillance since the Snowden disclosures, this thesis can address broader 
questions. First, the results will reveal the capacity of firms to resist surveillance and which 
methods were more or less effective. The presumption that firms are well equipped to resist 
surveillance will be reviewed on a per affordance basis and between affordances. Second, the 
presumption that any failures are the result of firms’ unwillingness to jeopardize business 
models will be confirmed or denied based on the findings for each affordance. If self-
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preservation precluded firms from committing to protect the individual privacy of their users, 
the skepticism of privacy advocates will be substantiated. 
 
Chapter II of this thesis covers background and existing literature to provide context 
prior to the affordance reviews. The background section includes the history of U.S.-based firms 
with government surveillance and mass data collection; metrics establishing the dominance of 
U.S.-based firms; market segmentation demonstrating the importance of non-U.S. markets; 
relevant non-U.S. data protection regulations; and an overview of authorizing U.S. surveillance 
legislation. The existing literature section will review available evaluations of U.S.-based firms 
resisting surveillance from two angles. The first angle covers the manner in which firms have 
resisted surveillance and the critical role they play in the broader surveillance environment. The 
second angle covers not only how equipped firms are to resist surveillance, but also their role as 
gatekeepers of individual privacy. The latter angle includes Ryan Calo’s “Can Americans Resist 
Surveillance” that not only supports the claims of other literature that firms are most suitable to 
resist surveillance, but also introduces the framework used as the methodology of this thesis 
(Calo 2015). 
 
Chapter III explains the methodology of this thesis in more detail, including the methods 
measured within each affordance, which firms will be included in the study, and the hypotheses 
this thesis aims to answer. Following the methodology overview, each affordance is reviewed. At 
the end of each affordance section, the findings are rated to measure the success or failure of 
firm surveillance resistance. Based on those findings, firms will also be rated on their 
commitment to individual privacy relative to the demands of a data driven business model. 
 
Chapter IV summarizes the results from all four affordances. These results are analyzed 
and discussed in Chapter V and the methodology as a whole will be critically reviewed. Chapter 
VI concludes this thesis and provides suggestions for follow up research. 
 
This thesis focuses primarily on the U.S.-based technology platform firms with relation 
to U.S. government surveillance, but is relevant to macro conversations covering their global 
accumulation of power and the evolution of societal expectations of digital privacy. The 
competing dynamics that complicate surveillance resistance are a microcosm for the broader 
tradeoffs that global markets, governments, and citizens will have to navigate when determining 
what the future of privacy and surveillance should be in both the private sector and the public 
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sector. A future that demands privacy and digital sovereignty will force firms to make 
substantial changes. It may be a reckoning of the surveillance capitalism that built them. 
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Chapter II: Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
 
A. History of Surveillance 
 
Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft are dominant U.S.-based multinational technology 
firms that wield tremendous power based on the number of users, data, and capital they possess. 
As these firms expand into other areas of daily life, they increase the network effects that drive 
user loyalty, engagement, and retention; so much that opting out of their services becomes cost 
prohibitive to consumers (Manjoo 2016). The data collected from users of a firm’s platform have 
become intangible capital assets with long term value (Lo and Brynjolfsson 2016). Originally, 
firms extracted the value of collected data assets by iterating and improving their own platform 
to retain current users and attract new users based on the feedback the data assets revealed. 
Data collection resulted in a surplus of assets, so firms like Google redirected their data assets to 
a market exchange like digital advertising. The value of data, particularly data that can predict 
or manipulate future consumer behavior, has bred a new market dynamic described by 
Shoshanna Zuboff as “surveillance capitalism”. This new form of commerce allows firms to 
utilize the troves of data collected from their users to either refine predictive analytics 
capabilities on their own platforms, or apply those capabilities to an external market, like 
advertising, thereby converting users from customers to sources of valuable data assets. 
Surveillance capitalism incentivizes firms to expand the channels of user data collection to 
maximize predictive capabilities sold on the market (Zuboff 2016). User data collection and 
retention is fundamental to their ability to generate revenue via surveillance capitalism. 
 
In 2013, several technology firms were implicated in assisting U.S. government surveillance 
previously unbeknownst to the public. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward 
Snowden leaked classified documents including a presentation detailing direct government 
access to platform technology firms’ servers, naming firms like Apple, Facebook, Google, and 
Microsoft (Welch 2013). Over the last five years, these firms have employed a variety of methods 
to mitigate any residual costs of being named in the disclosures while continuing to expand their 
power and influence. Any perceived surreptitious access to user data by U.S.-intelligence 
agencies places firms in a quagmire. Demands for privacy by users or governments establishes 
an existential threat to firms that rely on surveillance capitalism. The willingness of users to 
exchange their data for platform services is based on users’ fundamental misunderstandings 
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about the exchange of their data and/or the value of their data. Users overestimate government 
regulation over data sharing, lack understanding of how their data is exchanged, and 
underestimate the value of their own data (Turow, Hennessy, and Draper 2015, 16). An event 
like the Snowden disclosures, which exposes privacy failings and adversely impacts user sharing 
behaviors or the flow and control of data across borders, undermines surveillance capitalism. At 
the same time, the data troves that firms collect and retain to sustain a surveillance capitalism 
model can be invaluable sources of intelligence for U.S.-agencies charged with protecting 
national security. The U.S. government exploits the global market dominance of U.S.-based 
platform technology firms to serve as an extension of existing surveillance capabilities. This 
thesis will evaluate how Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft have responded to the 
disclosures to assuage privacy concerns while simultaneously protecting a business model 
predicated on widespread surveillance. 
 
B. The current landscape 
 
As technology and data collection become increasingly ubiquitous in daily life, global 
dependence on the largest and most powerful consumer technology firms will necessitate an 
evolution in the intersection of society, government, and technology. The largest consumer 
technology firms, all based in the U.S., accounted for 37 percent of gains when the S&P 500 saw 
record growth in 2017 (Popper 2017). In June 2017, Facebook hit a record of 2 billion monthly 
active users (Constine 2017). In the final quarter of 2016, Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android 
made up 99.6 percent of new smartphone market share worldwide (Vincent 2017). These 
dominant platforms have entrenched their ability to thrive in surveillance capitalism by 
establishing powerful network effects. Network effects are prolific when users participate in 
value creation and add value to other users. When existing users attract new users to interact on 
the same platform, existing users avoid social cost caused by migrating to another platform; size 
begets size and growth begets growth, making the incumbent firms defensible against upstarts 
(Currier 2017). Additionally, firms with an external market can use their network effect as a 
competitive advantage based on their ability to reach and retain an outsized user base. For 
example, by July 2017, that year’s projections saw that Google and Facebook accounted for more 
than 60 percent of domestic digital advertising revenue and over 50 percent of global 
advertising revenue (Ingram 2017). 
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Global market dominance of U.S.-based firms is instigating several forms of government 
scrutiny in markets around the world. In June 2017, the European Union (EU) levied Google 
with a record $2.7 billion fine for violating antitrust regulations related to price comparison 
search results that favored Google’s own service (“The European Union” 2017). A $122 million 
fine was levied on Facebook in May 2017 by EU antitrust regulators for matching identities 
between Facebook users and users of the newly acquired firm Whatsapp (Bendix 2017). In 2016, 
the EU commission ruled that Ireland provided illegal state aid to Apple in the form of a 1% 
corporation tax rate and forced Ireland to collect $15 billion in back taxes (“Ireland forced” 
2017). These actions demonstrate a willingness to hold prominent U.S.-based technology firms 
to high data protection and antitrust standards. However, regional accountability of 
multinational firms can also create complex conflict of law situations when applying governance 
to a global internet. In June 2017, the Canadian Supreme Court demanded that Google remove 
search results for Datalink Technology Gateways, a distributor accused of repackaging pirated 
equipment from the firm Equustek. Google has since filed an injunction with the U.S. District 
Court in Northern California claiming that removing the search results is a violation of the First 
Amendment (Alba 2017a). In Google LLC, v. Equustek Solutions Inc., injunction relief was 
granted on the basis that extraterritorially forcing removal of third party content by Google 
violated Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act1. Google is also resisting proposed 
application of the EU right to be forgotten beyond the borders of the EU. This would effectively 
apply EU law to non-EU countries and require the suppression of content that would otherwise 
be lawful (Fleischer 2017). 
 
Concerns about U.S. government surveillance and surveillance capitalist U.S.-based firms 
have prompted non-U.S. governments to implement privacy focused frameworks and 
regulations that focus on the global nature of the internet. The EU’s Privacy Shield and the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) address both U.S. government surveillance and 
surveillance capitalism. Privacy Shield is the successor to the prior Safe Harbor agreement that 
was invalidated following the Snowden disclosures based on U.S.-based firms’ inability to 
protect EU citizen data from mass surveillance. The invalidation of Safe Harbor created 
uncertainty for firms, threatening transatlantic data flows that tech firms rely on to conduct 
business in the EU (Pfeifle 2015). As with the Safe Harbor predecessor, U.S.-based firms use 
Privacy Shield to self-certify as adequately protecting privacy under applicable EU privacy law – 
                                                
1 Google LLC, v Equustek Solutions Inc., Case No. 17-cv-04207 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017). 
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either the Data Protection Directive or the GDPR starting May 2018. Facebook, Google, and 
Microsoft utilize Privacy Shield to self-certify.  
 
Privacy Shield improves on Safe Harbor by offering EU residents recourse to hold U.S.-
based firms accountable for any non-compliance including complaint submission and reply 
within 45 days, cost free independent dispute resolution, and available binding arbitration if 
necessary (“Privacy Shield List” n.d.). When related to National Security Access, EU residents 
can submit complaints to their Data Protection Authority and the complaint will be reviewed 
and handed off to the appointed U.S. Privacy Shield Ombudsperson (“EU – U.S. Privacy Shield 
Ombudsman” 2017). In September 2017, the EU Commission and U.S. authorities conducted 
the first annual review of Privacy Shield. The commission affirmed that the regulation ensures 
adequate levels of protection and offered recommendations for improvement, including added 
protections for non-U.S. citizens when reforming U.S.-surveillance law and permanent 
appointments of vacant U.S. positions integral to the agreement (“EU – U.S. Privacy Shield: 
First review” 2017). However, Privacy Shield still faces several challenges. The Working Party 29 
(WP29) representing the Data Protection Authorities of each EU member state published 
similar Privacy Shield concerns as the EU Commission but added a deadline of May 25, 2018 - 
the effective date for GDPR -  for the filling of permanent Privacy Shield ombudsperson and 
remaining Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) vacancies. If the vacancies are 
not filled, WP29 will challenge the adequacy of Privacy Shield in national courts (Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party 2017). In October 2017 the Irish High Court ruled to escalate the Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner’s request to Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to 
determine if existing transatlantic data transfer mechanisms adequately protect EU citizen data 
from U.S. government surveillance. The mechanisms in question were Privacy Shield and the 
use of standard contractual clauses (SCC). SCCs are alternative data transfer agreements used 
by firms like Facebook and Apple that are reviewed and approved by the EU Commission 
(“Privacy Policy” 2018a) in lieu of, or in addition to, Privacy Shield self-certification (Meyer 
2017). If the CJEU affirms the claims of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, the use of 
SCCs, and potentially Privacy Shield, could be invalidated. The absence of these cross-border 
data transfer mechanisms may leave firms like Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Apple with no 
legal mechanism for transatlantic data transfers. Five years after the Snowden disclosures, the 
threat of U.S. government surveillance continues to put firm operations in EU markets at risk. 
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The vulnerability of Privacy Shield and SCCs is further complicated by the impending EU 
GDPR. The GDPR replaces the Data Protection Directive ensuring EU resident rights over the 
access, portability, and erasure of their personal data. The GDPR also has stricter breach 
notification and informed consent requirements. Critically, the GDPR explicitly applies 
extraterritorially. Any firm controlling or processing personal data of data subjects within the 
EU at the time of collection are subject to GDPR compliance, even if the firm is based outside of 
the EU. Penalties for non-compliance are fees between 2 percent and 4 percent of global 
revenue, depending on the violation (“Guide to GDPR” n.d.). GDPR compliant transfer of data 
outside of the EU requires the use of safeguard mechanisms like Privacy Shield or SCCs. If those 
mechanisms are deemed inadequate and invalidated, there is a risk that transfer of EU resident 
personal data outside of the EU would constitute a violation of the GDPR (Determann, 
Hengesbaugh, and Weigl 2016). The GDPR provides EU residents consent and control 
protections that threaten both government surveillance and surveillance capitalist models. 
Informed specified use and consent requirements prohibit deceptive or ambiguous data 
collection and sharing practices. Disclosure, correction, erasure, and portability rights allow EU 
residents to control the valuable surveillance asset that is their personal data. Transfer 
mechanisms are required under the GDPR and current U.S. government surveillance threatens 
the viability of those mechanisms. The regulation’s punitive enforcement mechanisms paired 
with the willingness of EU regulators to hold firms like Google and Facebook accountable 
presents significant risk in operating surveillance based data collection in the EU. 
 
U.S.-based tech platform multinationals are also facing operational changes in Asia. In 2017, 
China introduced the China Cybersecurity Law (CSL) that addresses data protection concerns 
that resulted from the Snowden disclosures (Gidda 2017). The CSL’s data protection 
requirements, like informed consent and data integrity requirements, align with other 
international data protection frameworks. However, the CSL is much more restrictive on cross-
border data transfers. The CSL requires firms collecting Chinese citizen personal data to store 
data locally within China. If a firm requires transfer of personal data outside of China’s borders, 
the firm must undergo a security assessment prior to authorization. Although the law is 
currently in effect, it has not been fully implemented. A draft encryption law that is being 
considered would require firms using encryption technologies to provide decryption support for 
national security or criminal investigations (Bigg 2017). The compliance date for cross-border 
data transfer sections has been moved to December 31, 2018 and there are competing factions in 
China debating the practical application of the CSL’s broad guidelines. But as seen in the EU, the 
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global freedom of data movement that has benefited U.S.-based firms is being challenged. The 
importance of data protection in China is beyond the EU’s focus on a fundamental right of 
privacy. China considers their citizen data as an asset akin to other natural resources and have 
linked data protection to national security to reflect that position (Sacks, Triolo, and Webster 
2017). 
 
China has been both an attractive market for growth and a difficult market to operate in. 
Firms have experienced different relationships with China. Chinese reliance on Microsoft’s 
Windows operating system has been problematic for both China and Microsoft. Windows XP 
was widely used in China but highly pirated. Chinese authorities promoted Linux variants to 
mitigate reliance on the foreign OS. Following the Snowden disclosures, Windows 8 was banned 
for use by the Chinese government (Gallagher 2017). In 2014, Microsoft ended support for 
Windows XP to pressure users into upgrading their OS to Windows 10. This move exposed how 
dependent China was on an OS that was more than a decade old, resulting in public criticism 
and an anti-monopoly investigation by Chinese regulators that has yet to be resolved (Mozur, 
Wingfield 2016). Despite facing efforts to exploit or undermine Microsoft’s success in China, the 
firm continues attempts to advance the relationship. In 2017, Microsoft partnered with a state-
owned China Electronics Technology Group to develop a custom version of Windows 10 for the 
Chinese government (Dou, Jie, and Greene 2017). 
 
Currently, neither Google or Facebook operate their core products in China. Facebook was 
blocked by the Chinese government following riots in 2009 when leaders claimed that the social 
media platform was used to sow unrest. Since then, Facebook has been working to regain access 
to China and demonstrates a willingness to make changes to appease and appeal to the Chinese 
government. Facebook has made several executive hires with experience in China to build 
relationships and navigate China’s bureaucracy. CEO Mark Zuckerberg has joined Apple CEO 
Tim Cook and Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella on the board of Tsinghua University’s School of 
Economics and Management, met directly with President Xi Jinping, and assigned Facebook 
engineers to work on tools to allow a third party, like China, to block content. Zuckerberg has 
described Facebook’s mission as connecting the world and publicly expressed the futility of that 
mission without China (Abkowitz, Seetharaman, and Dou 2017).  
 
Google has a more adversarial relationship with China. In 2010, Google discovered a 
cyberattack and phishing scheme originating in China that stole intellectual property and 
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accessed the Google accounts of human rights activists (Drummond 2010a). Following the 
incident, Google decided to reroute uncensored Google.cn traffic to servers in Hong Kong after 
four years of operating in compliance with China’s censorship requirements for search 
(Drummond 2010b). In response, the Chinese government blocked Google’s services. Google 
has continued to be resistant to Chinese demands. Google’s mobile operating system Android 
exists on smartphones in China, but Google has not been able to introduce their native Play 
Store because the firm refuses to censor apps. The only progress Google has made in China is an 
introduction of its Tensorflow AI tools to attract Chinese developers. Google has devoted 
resources to attracting Chinese talent and establish some presence in China. However, there will 
still be barriers to success. Developers must host data on servers within China rather than 
depending on blocked Google cloud services and the Chinese government may limit the use of 
Chinese datasets (Minter 2017). Facebook and Google’s business models (social media and 
search, respectively) have prevented access to a population whose active online users are twice 
the entire population of the United States (McKirdy 2015). China has made it clear that if U.S.-
based tech platforms want access to their prospective users, China will be the one to dictate the 
terms. 
 
Apple’s relationship with China has been deferential. The Chinese government forced Apple 
to shut down the iTunes and iBooks stores six months after each launched with no public 
explanation offered by Apple or Chinese officials (Whittaker 2016). In 2017, Apple removed the 
New York Times app from the App store. The New York Times website, as with sites of other 
western publications like the Wall Street Journal and the Guardian, were already blocked in 
China to restrict information that is perceived as rumor or a threat to national security (Mickle 
and Alpert 2017). Conceivably, users in China could access New York Times content by changing 
their perceived geolocation. Later that year, Apple removed 674 virtual private network (VPN) 
apps that Chinese citizens could use to circumvent the state firewall and censorship restrictions. 
In 2018, Apple moved all Chinese user iCloud data and the encryption keys for that data to a 
local data center run by state owned Guizhou - Cloud Big Data Industry Co Ltd. to comply with 
recently enacted Cybersecurity and National Security laws (Nellis and Cadell 2018). Apple’s 
cooperation with China has drawn criticism from human rights groups and congressional 
scrutiny from Senators Ted Cruz and Patrick Leahy (Reisinger 2017). In response, CEO Tim 
Cook has espoused two rationales for Apple’s cooperation with Chinese authorities. First, when 
operating within a country, a firm is subject to the laws of that government even if they do not 
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always agree. Second, it is better to participate and attempt change from the inside (Strumpf 
2017). 
 
The United States has historically been hands-off when regulating U.S.-based tech firms. 
The last significant U.S. data protection ruling against a U.S.-based platform technology firm 
was in 2011 when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) settled an eight-count complaint with 
Facebook, requiring the firm to make improvements to informed user consent, changes to data 
sharing practices including with third parties, and obtain independently audited privacy 
assessments. The FTC found that Facebook had been deceptive about their controls over access 
to user data by third parties like advertisers or app developers. Examples of deceptive practices 
included allowing third party apps more access than the stated limits of data required for the 
app to operate, allowing access to supposedly inaccessible deleted or deactivated account 
content, and sharing user data with advertisers while claiming otherwise (“Facebook Settles 
FTC” 2011). The FTC has the ability to fine Facebook for violations but has yet to do so even 
though Facebook had uncovered third party access to user data without consent that prompted 
Facebook to restrict access allowances. Based on FTC comments on controversial third party 
access to up to 50 million user accounts, Facebook’s discovery of non-consensual access to data 
belonging to friends of consenting users was unreported and highlights the inadequacy of even 
the strongest example of U.S. data protection (Dolven, Thompson 2018). 
 
In 2013, FTC staff suggested that the commission file a lawsuit against Google practices that 
were considered anti-competitive, but FTC commissioners voted unanimously against it 
(Mullins, Winkler, and Kendall 2015). The FTC’s investigation included the same search 
preference practices that resulted in the $2.7 billion fine levied by the EU. Where the EU 
determined Google’s search practices stifled competition, the FTC determined that the same 
practices improved the user experience (Arthur 2013). 
 
In 2015, President Obama described the European Union’s comparatively punitive 
regulations as being largely protectionist. Obama surmised that EU regulations, purportedly 
based on values like privacy and security, were actually roadblocks designed to minimize U.S.-
based tech sector dominance (Swisher 2015). 
 
Data protection authorities are being established around the globe, but the U.S. uses a 
sectoral approach to data protection that only regulates what has been prescribed as the most 
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sensitive data. The existing data protection laws are too focused on protecting exposure of 
sensitive data and less considerate of individual agency over one’s own data (O’Connor 2018). 
The U.S.’s current approach to data protection is an ideal environment for surveillance capitalist 
firms to thrive. Google’s Eric Schmidt once described the “online world” as “the world’s largest 
ungoverned space” (Zuboff 2016), but the freedom that has allowed U.S.-based firms to become 
globally dominant is diminishing. Foreign governments recognize that their citizens’ data are 
valuable assets necessitating modern regulations in the name of privacy, protectionism, and 
national security. The U.S. government was exposed as having leveraged the global market 
dominance of U.S.-based firms as an arm of surveillance providing foreign governments with 
additional urgency and legitimacy to protect their citizens’ data. 
 
C. What’s at stake? 
 
Globally, U.S.-based technology platform firms rank highly when measuring global public 
perception of the top 100 firms by market capitalization. Apple and Microsoft ranked numbers 
one and two respectively, with Facebook at number six, and Google’s parent organization 
Alphabet at number twenty-one (“How Global Top 100” n.d.). The high financial and 
reputational rankings of the largest platform technology firms is not coincidental. Popularity is a 
reflection of the data-network-effect where firms collect as much user data as possible. This in 
turn helps firms refine and improve services, leading to more users, which generates additional 
data for improvement, and leading to even more users. Data has replaced oil as a driver for 
growth, incentivizing ever increasing data collection ("Data is giving” 2017). These data driven 
U.S.-based technology platform firms offer governments and law enforcement a rich pool of data 
collected globally. 
 
The top five U.S.-based technology firms (Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft) 
are worth an aggregated $3 Trillion in market capitalization (Wilhelm 2017). Fifteen of the 
world’s top twenty-five largest technology firms are based in the U.S., with eight included in the 
top ten. In 2016, U.S.-based technology firms sold over $300 billion in technology goods and 
services to international customers (Hodgkins III and Kallmer 2017). Apple, Alphabet (Google), 
Microsoft, and Facebook segment their revenue by geography in their annual Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, as seen in Tables 1 through 4. 
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Table 1: Geographic Segmentation of Revenue for Alphabet (Google) (Dollars in Millions): 
Domestic ‘16 EMEA ‘16 APAC ‘16 Domestic ‘17 EMEA ‘17 APAC ‘17 
$42,781 
(47%) 
$30,304 
(34%) 
$12,559 
(14%) 
$52,449 
(47%) 
$36,046 
(33%) 
$16,235 
(15%) 
Source: Form 10-K Period Ending December 31, 2017 
 
Table 2: Geographic Segmentation of Revenue for Apple (Dollars in Millions): 
America’s ‘16 Europe ‘16 China ‘16 America’s ‘17 Europe ‘17 China ‘17 
$86,613 
(40%) 
$49,952 
(23%) 
$48,492 
(22%) 
$96,600 
(42%) 
$54,938 
(24%) 
$44,764 
(20%) 
Source: Form 10-K Period Ending September 30, 2017 
 
Table 3: Geographic Segmentation of Revenue for Facebook (Dollars in Millions): 
U.S. ‘16 Foreign ‘16 U.S. ‘17 Foreign ‘17 
$12,579 
(46%) 
$15,059 
(54%) 
$17,734 
(44%) 
$22,919 
(56%) 
Source: Form 10-K Period Ending December 31, 2017 
 
Table 4: Geographic Segmentation of Revenue for Microsoft (Dollars in Millions): 
U.S. ‘16 Other Countries ‘16 U.S. ‘17 Other Countries ‘17 
$40,578 
(48%) 
$44,742 
(52%) 
$45,248 
(50%) 
$44,702 
(50%) 
Source: Form 10-K Period Ending June 30, 2017 
 
Based on annual 10-K SEC filings for Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft, at least 50 
percent of revenue for each firm was generated outside of the U.S. in both 2016 and 2017. In 
2017, a combined 48 percent of Google’s revenue came from the Europe, Middle East, Africa 
(EMEA) and Asia-Pacific (APAC) segments and a combined 44 percent of Apple’s revenue came 
from Europe and China. U.S. government surveillance reduces trust and incentivizes strong data 
protection regulation - as seen in the EU, Japan, and China - that threaten the viability of 
significant foreign markets. 
 
Market dominance and popularity offer a lot for firms to lose when firms are implicated 
in U.S. government surveillance. Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft deny that the U.S. 
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government was ever given direct access to servers (Welch 2013a). However, the perception that 
the U.S. government was granted any privileged access to user data forced multiple stakeholders 
to respond. Non-U.S. governments threatened new regulations and penalties that could increase 
operating costs or loss of business (Sargsyan 2016, 2223-2225). Non-U.S. competitors leveraged 
public distrust to encroach on U.S. technology firm market dominance. In 2013, the Information 
Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) projected losses to the technology industry 
resulting from the Snowden disclosures as high as $35 billion by 2016. In a 2015 article 
revisiting the impact of government surveillance on the technology industry, ITIF predicts that 
the losses will far exceed those initial estimates (Castro and McQuinn 2015). 
 
The costs incurred by U.S.-based platform technology firms are being administered 
internationally but changes to U.S. government surveillance is reliant on public and political will 
domestically. Following the Snowden disclosures, Americans expressed concern over privacy 
and surveillance. PEW research conducted from 2014 to 2015 showed that 52 percent of 
Americans were concerned about surveillance and 34 percent of those who knew anything about 
the disclosures had changed their communications or online activities (Rainie and Madden 
2015, 3). Sixty-five percent of respondents believed there were inadequate limits to government 
collection of telephone or internet data. If respondents had heard a lot about the disclosures, the 
percentage of respondents who felt limits were inadequate increased to 74 percent. Ninety-three 
percent of respondents felt it was important to control who can get information about them 
(Madden and Rainie 2015, 4). An Anzalone Liszt Grove poll from 2014 found that 63 percent of 
respondents wanted more oversight over surveillance programs (Byers 2014). Concern of 
government surveillance from constituents inspired bipartisan support for surveillance reform 
(Weisman 2013) culminating in the USA Freedom Act of 2015 which reformed telephony 
surveillance and added requirements for additional transparency (Samee Ali and Abdullah 
2016). 
 
In the years since, the Snowden disclosures public sentiment has dissipated. Surveys 
conducted in late 2017 by Lawfare showed that Americans had neither strong feelings in favor or 
opposition to U.S. government surveillance at a time when Congress was debating the 
surveillance law that authorizes intelligence community access to electronic communications. 
Sixty-seven percent of respondents chose ‘I don’t know/No opinion’ when asked if they favored 
continued authorization of the NSA and FBI to spy on overseas targets without a warrant. When 
asked about concern over NSA collection authorities, a majority 30.5 percent of respondents 
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chose the neutral ‘3’ on a five-point scale with ‘1’ being not concerned and ‘5’ being very 
concerned. The same question replacing the NSA with the FBI yielded a majority 28.8 percent 
choosing the neutral ‘3’ (Eoyang, Freeman, and Wittes 2018). Domestic apathy may have 
relieved political pressure to reform sun setting surveillance authorization. In January 2018 
Congress voted to extend the law that authorizes NSA warrantless surveillance of electronic 
communications and warrantless FBI querying of the collected data without proposed reforms. 
The reauthorization extended the surveillance authority for six years and potentially revived the 
use of controversial ‘about’ collection that increases the potential for domestic and foreign 
persons to be targeted for surveillance (Matsakis 2018). 
 
D. Authorizing legislation 
 
U.S. government access to data collected by platform technology firms is executed through 
upstream and downstream collection. Upstream collection refers to collection of data in transit 
via the internet backbone. Downstream collection refers to government requests compelling the 
disclosure of consumer data from companies like Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft (“End 
702” n.d.). U.S. government surveillance is authorized by two statutes: Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 and Title II of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). FISA 702 authorizes both upstream and 
downstream collection of data, requiring that the surveillance target be a foreign national 
located outside the United States. In addition, it requires that a significant purpose of the 
surveillance be for foreign intelligence information. Once collected and stored, the NSA, CIA, 
and FBI can query the data (“Section 702: What it is” 2017). FISA 702 does not limit the type of 
data collected and allows for non-content and content of communications collection. Targeting 
of communications is not authorized on a per target basis. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) approves the targeting procedures (Rosenzweig, Stimson, and Shedd 2016). The 
FISC is a sealed court which hears challenges to FISA requests and accompanying non-
disclosure orders that prohibit recipients from publicly disclosing any information related to the 
orders. Because the court is sealed, the outcome of any challenges, or even whether or not a 
challenge has been attempted, are not publicly available (“Are they allowed” n.d.). 
 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was created to protect wired, oral, and 
electronic communications during creation, transmission, and storage. Title I of the ECPA, 
known as the Wiretap Act, requires a warrant for interception of in-transit communications, 
  18 
with the exception of FISA (“Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986” n.d.). Title II, 
known as the Stored Communications Act (SCA), permits government access to stored 
communications held by a service provider, like Google, requiring a warrant, subpoena, or court 
order depending on the age of information sought (Brill 2016). The SCA authorizes the use of 
delayed notice or non-disclosure orders that prohibit electronic communications providers from 
notifying the target of the request and, where applicable, the target’s home country (Crusco 
2017). The ECPA also authorizes an FBI administrative subpoena known as a National Security 
Letter (NSL). NSLs are executed by the FBI and do not require judicial oversight. NSLs are also 
accompanied with non-disclosure orders prohibiting recipients from disclosing the receipt and 
contents of the NSL except to seek legal advice. Unlike FISA requests, NSLs have undergone 
some reform. The USA Freedom Act granted recipients of NSLs the ability to challenge the 
NSL’s non-disclosure order, prompting judicial review (“National Security Letters FAQ” n.d.). 
When requesting electronic communications data, NSLs can be used to obtain email addresses, 
screen names, billing records, and subscriber data without judicial review, but NSLs cannot be 
used to obtain contents of communications (“National Security Letters” n.d.). 
 
The ECPA also restricts firms from disclosing personal data to foreign governments. If a 
non-U.S. government requires data from a U.S.-based firm, the foreign government cannot go 
directly to the firm but must instead use Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT). The MLAT 
process requires review and approval by the Department of Justice. The current MLAT system is 
not efficient enough to reliably handle the increasing amount of requests necessitated by the 
ECPA restriction on disclosure (Woods 2015). This blocking provision turns U.S.-based platform 
technology firms’ global dominance into a surveillance advantage for the U.S. government over 
non-U.S. governments. All requests for data from non-U.S. governments require U.S. warrant 
approval from a judge, thus turning the U.S. government into a “middle man” for foreign 
requests when the U.S. government has no such restrictions. 
 
FISA requests and National Security Letters are at times lumped into one categorization 
called “National Security Orders” (NSO) (“U.S. National Security Orders Report” n.d.). Through 
litigation, the U.S. government has allowed firms like Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft to 
release transparency reports that include NSO request statistics. Tables 5 through 8 show the 
number of NSO received and the number of impacted accounts from the NSO requests. The U.S. 
government allows for two disclosure methods. Facebook, Microsoft, and Google opted to break 
NSO into types - FISA requests and National Security Letters - which restrict the data into larger 
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reporting blocks of 0 – 499. Apple opted to report NSO as a single category which allows for 
smaller reporting blocks of 0 – 249. Reporting is on a six-month delay.  
 
Table 5: National Security Order Requests for Apple 
Year - Half NSO Requests Accounts Affected Declassified NSL 
2014 - H1 0 - 249 0 - 249 0 
2014 - H2 250 - 499 0 - 249 0 
2015 - H1 750 - 999 250 - 499 0 
2015 - H2 13,250 - 13,499 1,000 - 1,249 0 
2016 - H1 2,750 - 2,999 2,000 - 2,249 0 
2016 - H2 5,750 - 5,999 4,750 - 4,999 1 
2017 - H1 13,250 - 13,499 9,000 - 9,249 0 
Data Source: “Report History” Privacy Accessed on 2017 Sept 28 
https://www.apple.com/privacy/transparency-reports/ 
 
Table 6: National Security Order Requests for Facebook 
Year - Half NSL Requests Accounts Requested 
2014 - H1 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2014 - H2 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2015 - H1 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2015 - H2 1 - 499 1 - 499 
2016 - H1 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2016 - H2 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2017 - H1 0 - 499 500 - 999 
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Table 6: National Security Order Requests for Facebook (continued) 
Year - Half FISA Content Req. Accounts Req. FISA Non-Con Req. Accounts Req. 
2014 - H1 0 - 499 7,000 - 7,499 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2014 - H2 0 - 499 7,000 - 7,499 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2015 - H1 500 - 999 13,500 - 13,999 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2015 - H2 500 - 999 13,500 - 13,999 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2016 - H1 500 - 999 13,000 - 13,499 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2016 - H2 500 - 999 12,500 - 12,999 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2017 - H1 Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported 
“Req.” = Requested 
Data Source: “National Security Requests for Data” Government Requests Report Accessed on 2017 Sept 
28 https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United%20States/2013-H2/ 
 
Table 7: National Security Order Requests for Google 
Year - Half NSL Requests Accounts Requested 
2014 - H1 500 - 999 500 - 999 
2014 - H2 0 - 499 500 - 999 
2015 - H1 0 - 499 500 - 999 
2015 - H2 1 - 499 500 - 999 
2016 - H1 0 - 499 500 - 999 
2016 - H2 0 - 499 1,000 - 1,499 
2017 - H1 0 - 499 1,000 - 1,499 
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Table 7: National Security Order Requests for Google (continued) 
Year - Half FISA Content Req. Accounts Req. FISA Non-Con Req. Accounts Req. 
2014 - H1 500 - 999 17,000 - 17,499 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2014 - H2 500 - 999 18,500 - 18,999 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2015 - H1 500 - 999 19,000 - 19,499 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2015 - H2 500 - 999 22,500 - 22,999 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2016 - H1 500 - 999 25,000 - 25,499 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2016 - H2 500 - 999 35,000 - 35,499 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2017 - H1 Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported 
“Req.” = Requested 
Data Source: “United States national security requests” Transparency Report 
Accessed on 2017 Sept 28 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview?user_requests_report_period=authority:US 
 
Table 8: National Security Order Requests for Microsoft 
Year - Half NSL Requests Accounts Requested 
2014 - H1 0 - 999 0 - 999 
2014 - H2 0 - 999 0 - 999 
2015 - H1 0 - 999 0 - 999 
2015 - H2 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2016 - H1 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2016 - H2 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2017 - H1 0 - 499 0 - 499 
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Table 8: National Security Order Requests for Microsoft (continued) 
Year - Half FISA Content Req. Accounts Req. FISA Non-Con Req. Accounts Req. 
2014 - H1 0 - 999 19,000 - 19,999 0 - 999 0 - 999 
2014 - H2 0 - 999 18,000 - 18,999 0 - 999 0 - 999 
2015 - H1 0 - 499 15,500 - 15,999 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2015 - H2 0 - 499 17,500 - 17,999 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2016 - H1 0 - 499 12,000 - 12,499 0 - 499 1000 - 1999 
2016 - H2 0 - 499 13,000 - 13,499 0 - 499 0 - 499 
2017 - H1 Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported 
2017 - H2 Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported  Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported 
“Req.” = Requested 
Data Source: “U.S. National Security Orders Report” Corporate Social Responsibility” 
Accessed on 2017 Sept 28 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/about/corporate-responsibility/fisa 
 
Reporting in blocks was a compromise firms made due to the government’s concern that 
reporting requests to the individual would threaten national security. Compromise aside, 
reporting in blocks still benefits firms because it provides observers with a more informed 
perspective on the U.S. government’s access compared to the speculation that followed the 
Snowden disclosures. The above reporting dispels the notion that the U.S. government was 
offered unfettered, clandestine backdoor access to user information. Even at their highest 
volume, the blocks of data requests are infinitesimal compared to the user totals of these four 
dominant firms. 
 
From an individual privacy perspective there are two aspects of the reporting that are 
notable. First, the 0 - 249 and 0 - 499 block ranges could reflect that a firm received zero NSO 
requests or up to 499 requests. These block ranges may contain the same amounts of requests as 
the higher block ranges, but their inclusion of zero means it is impossible for observers to know 
if a firm went six months without receiving a single NSO. Second, the growth in reporting data 
over the three and a half years covered is significant. Using the top end of each block, firms saw 
tremendous increases in NSO surveillance in the years since the Snowden disclosures. Apple’s 
NSO requests increased from 249 to 13,499 as seen in Table 5. The number of accounts 
impacted by Facebook’s FISA requests increased from 7,499 to 12,999 as seen in Table 6. The 
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number of accounts impacted by Google’s FISA requests increased from 17,499 to 35,499 as 
seen in Table 7. Microsoft was the only firm whose reporting decreased as seen in Table 8. 
 
The growth in NSO requests, lack of judicial oversight, and the frequent use of non-
disclosure orders with NSO has resulted in increased scrutiny from privacy advocates, including 
calls for reform and legal challenges. As the dominant platform technology firms increase their 
market control and fortify their network effects to collect more and more data, there is an 
expectation that the use of personal information as an asset obligates firms to protect the source 
of that valuable resource. The Electronic Frontier Foundation publishes an annual review titled 
“Who Has Your Back”. The review grades technology firms’ policies and actions concerning 
government data requests with the expectation that firms “stand up for user privacy” (Reitman 
2017a). But as powerful as Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft may be, their ability to resist 
U.S. government surveillance to protect user privacy is not as simple as choosing to “have their 
user’s back”. Multinational firms have multiple stakeholders, often with competing interests, to 
consider. The power and influence of firms is built on mass collection and exploitation of the 
very data that privacy advocates and users feel deserve protection. It may be presumptuous for 
privacy advocates and users to appoint technology platform firms as guardians of privacy. The 
ability of U.S.-based platform technology firms to operate in international markets has been 
jeopardized by U.S. government surveillance. Foreign governments have recognized that firms 
fueled by surveillance capitalism require constraining laws with significant penalties to protect 
the privacy of their citizens. The threat of increasingly restrictive international regulations is a 
potentially major motivating factor when firms establish policies and positions on U.S. 
government surveillance, especially considering that more than 50 percent of annual revenue for 
Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft is generated from international markets. The 
motivations of firms are central to this thesis. Is the ability of firms to resist surveillance driven 
by an ideological obligation to users or is it due to pressure from outside stakeholders holding 
firms accountable for the protection of user privacy? 
 
E. Existing Literature Review 
 
In the years since the Snowden disclosures, existing literature has covered the role of 
technology firms when resisting surveillance from various angles. 
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In Corporate Privacy Policy Changes during PRISM and the Rise of Surveillance Capitalism 
Priya Kumar focused on the nine firms that were named in the leaked NSA PRISM documents, 
plus Twitter, to examine how firms adapted after their involvement in U.S. government 
surveillance was made public. Kumar studied the changes made to each firm’s public privacy 
policy since the disclosures to determine if firms were becoming more privacy focused to resist 
surveillance or inadvertently enhancing government surveillance capabilities by expanding 
surveillance capitalist capabilities. Based on the changes between pre-Snowden and post-
Snowden privacy policies, Kumar found that firms expanded their collection and use of personal 
data assets. This prompted Kumar to call for more involvement of firms in public conversations 
over U.S. government surveillance given their power and role as an implicit arm of U.S. 
government surveillance (Kumar 2016, 63-69). 
 
Alan Z. Rozenshtein’s Surveillance Intermediaries answered Kumar’s call by comprehensively 
evaluating the role that U.S.-based platform technology firms play as third party participants in 
government surveillance described by Rozenshtein as “surveillance intermediaries.” 
Rozenshtein emphasized the centrality of surveillance intermediaries to modern day 
surveillance based both on the digital replacement of traditionally surveilled communications 
and the enhanced capabilities that ubiquitous mass data collection offers the government. 
Traditional communications, like postage mail and telephone calls, have given way to the rise of 
email, chat, and social media that is controlled and operated by surveillance intermediaries like 
Apple, Facebook, and Google. To Rozenshtein, these surveillance intermediaries are not only 
uniquely equipped to resist surveillance, but unlike legacy communications firms, have proven 
willing to do so. Rozenshtein covered a broad range of techniques used by surveillance 
intermediaries described as “proceduralism,” litigiousness, technological unilateralism, and 
policy mobilization. These techniques demonstrated the multifaceted capabilities at the disposal 
of surveillance intermediaries that systematically alter the surveillance environment and 
reinforce the centrality of firms to U.S. government surveillance. Throughout his evaluation, 
Rozenshtein focused on the impact surveillance intermediaries had on the broader surveillance 
environment, including intragovernmental checks on surveillance and an ideological discussion 
of the power held by surveillance intermediaries. Ultimately, Rozenshtein assessed the quasi-
sovereignty of surveillance intermediaries and the duality of their influence both enhancing and 
limiting U.S. government surveillance (Rozenshtein 2018, 99-189). 
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In Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth Amendment, author 
Avidan Cover explored the capacity of technology firms to serve as ‘corporate avatars’ for 
individuals. As ‘corporate avatars,’ firms would act as surrogate defenders of individual privacy 
by challenging U.S. government surveillance practices and asserting constitutionally protected 
rights on their users’ behalf. The necessity of a ‘corporate avatar’ is rooted in case law 
establishing the third party doctrine. The third party doctrine states that individuals who 
voluntarily provide their information to a third party are no longer entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection because that information is no longer considered private. The gravity of 
the third party doctrine is elevated by an environment where access to essential electronic 
communications services necessitates the forfeiture of personal data. Mass data collection by 
firms paired with the third party doctrine forces firms into a position where they can be either a 
guardian of privacy rights or an agent of U.S. government surveillance. Cover was concerned 
that firms would be reluctant to challenge the U.S. government to protect their surveillance 
capitalist business models. Cover noted that taking a position that emphasized the rights of 
users over the access and use of their personal data could draw attention to technology platform 
firms’ own commodification of personal information and invite regulation. If the data collection 
that fuels surveillance capitalism is hindered in the service of being a corporate avatar, Cover’s 
concerns may be valid. Cover concluded that the corporate avatar dynamic is ineffective in 
practice and lamented that technology firms would only be worthy avatars if their financial 
priorities aligned with consumer demand for individual privacy (Cover 2015, 1444-1502). An 
illustrative example of this is the use of encryption. Unlike litigation or legislation, firms have 
the freedom to implement encryption without any reliance on a third party for permission or 
support. The use of in-transit encryption protects individual privacy by limiting the value of 
upstream surveillance without negatively impacting surveillance capitalism. In-transit 
encryption is an example of Cover’s conclusion that firms would only act on behalf of individual 
privacy when doing so does not threaten their business model. The implementation of end-to-
end encryption would challenge Cover. End-to-end encryption would limit both U.S. 
government and firm access to personal data assets. If a surveillance capitalist firm 
implemented end-to-end encryption on their platform, the firm would be prioritizing individual 
privacy over the firm’s access to revenue driving personal data assets. 
 
Christopher Soghoian’s article An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging 
Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government calls for more engineering and policy 
decisions to limit the surveillance capabilities of the government. Soghoian viewed the 
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engineering and transparency policies of technology firms as methods to facilitate a competitive 
market where consumers would select firms based on corporate disclosure and privacy policy. 
Soghoian relies on the belief that user demand for privacy will be strong enough to create 
market incentives for firms to implement more privacy-by-design and limit disclosure to 
government. Suggested privacy-by-design methods include transport encryption to prevent 
network surveillance; end-to-end encryption where even the firm doesn’t have a decryption key; 
and limited or zero data retention policies to reduce or eliminate the amount of data stored and 
available for disclosure. Soghoian believed that if firms implemented privacy-by-design, they 
could compete with one another over users who value privacy. By not taking a privacy-by-design 
approach, Soghoian believed firms were revealing that they did not value privacy as much as 
they have publicly expressed (Soghoian 2015). The methods Soghoian offers are so privacy 
focused that they potentially nullify the utility of firms as a source of data for U.S. government 
surveillance. However, the methods are also an impediment to surveillance capitalism. Even if 
users were motivated to choose firms based on privacy, the value of those users would be 
diminished because the lack of access to personal information limits the firm’s ability to improve 
their own products or feed advertising models. Soghoian’s belief that users would leverage 
market influence to promote implementation of privacy-by-design features conflicts with 
Cover’s lack of confidence in corporate avatars. As long as firms depend on user assets to drive 
revenue, diminished data access is as much a threat to business as losing users. Firm needs and 
user needs would not be in alignment, leading to Cover’s skepticism that privacy protective 
features would actually be utilized. 
 
Ryan Calo’s essay Can Americans Resist Surveillance repurposes James Gibson’s 
Affordance Theory for legal application. Gibson’s theory was originally applied to ecological 
psychology to study the complementarity between organisms and their environment. To Gibson, 
observing affordances requires understanding the relative relationship between an organism 
and the environment grounded in the ability of the organism to take an action, or have an action 
happen to the organism. Critically, Gibson felt the relationship must be observed empirically 
and not theoretically (Scarantino 2003, 949-955). Calo’s essay applies this ecological framework 
as a legal framework by studying the observed affordances of U.S. citizens in their ability to 
resist surveillance through four affordance methods - legal, political, technical, and market. The 
U.S. citizen serves as the organism operating in an environment of surveillance governed by 
existing U.S. legal structures. Calo’s essay concludes that U.S. citizens have available affordances 
to theoretically resist surveillance, but his empirically backed observations reveal these 
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affordances to be ineffective. Legal affordance challenges to surveillance via litigation are 
stymied by established precedent on standing and the third-party doctrine. Political affordance 
challenges to surveillance are limited by public choice theory where diffuse opinions of 
surveillance are not compelling enough for citizens to act as passionately as special interest 
groups.  Technical affordance challenges to surveillance are available, but are not readily usable 
to the average citizen, creating both barriers to entry and a high risk of error when attempted by 
the layperson. Finally, market affordance challenges require citizens to collectively pressure 
firms to resist surveillance through market forces. Calo even references Cover’s concept of 
‘corporate avatars’ and expressed similar skepticism as Cover that firms would sufficiently serve 
in an avatar role. Reliance on firms was a consistent theme of Calo’s essay and he even states, 
“Against a background of corporate and other law, and given access to enormous resources, 
large firms are well positioned to push back against government surveillance if properly 
motivated. The motivation appears to be mounting in the form of domestic and, to a large 
degree, international pressure on American firms to put citizen-consumer privacy first” (Calo 
2015, 1-15). Although firms are not organisms like citizens, the use of a formerly ecological 
theory is appropriate because firms and the environment they occupy are analogous to complex 
adaptive systems (CAS) that organisms occupy in the natural world. Natural CAS are shaped by 
organisms as individual agents responding to feedback through the property of emergence. 
Emergence occurs when interactions between individual agents and the environment result in 
feedback that reshapes the system which then trickles down to influence agents and perpetuate 
emergence feedback loops. In a CAS, individual agents within their system must balance their 
own needs with the needs of other agents to benefit the broader natural environment. A firm’s 
environment is a CAS. While firms must protect themselves, their choices impact the other firms 
in their business ecosystem that they compete with and/or depend on. The choices of all these 
firms impact the business environment at large - which includes outside stakeholders like 
government entities and civil society - creating an emergence loop. Firms that do not create 
value to outside stakeholders risk marginalization. In an increasingly volatile business 
environment where U.S.-based public companies are delisting at a rate six times the rate forty 
years prior, firms must navigate emergence loops with long term goals in mind to avoid 
extinction. Planning for long term goals is difficult in a CAS due to the system’s inherent 
unpredictability. Firms must expect surprise to reduce uncertainty, meaning that in an 
unpredictable environment firms must collect signals and plan for a variety of plausible 
desirable or undesirable outcomes. Predicting the future will fail in a CAS. Firms are better 
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served to prepare for many possible futures so that when surprise occurs, the firms can adapt to 
survive (Reeves, Levin, and Ueda 2016). 
 
This thesis will test Calo’s assertion that firms are well equipped to resist surveillance; 
Soghoian’s assertion that privacy-by-design is advantageous to firms; and both Calo and Cover’s 
assertions that firms are not worthy avatars for their users when resisting U.S. government 
surveillance. This thesis also recognizes that firms are resisting surveillance within a complex 
adaptive system that complicates the actions firms take to achieve desirable outcomes and 
mitigate undesirable outcomes. Calo’s approach to Affordance Theory will be used to evaluate 
the ability of Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft to resist U.S. government surveillance. 
Affordance Theory allows for an evaluation of the relationship between U.S.-based platform 
technology firms and U.S. government surveillance that is not grounded in a singular critique of 
a firm’s ability, willingness, or obligation to defend individual privacy. This thesis will determine 
if firms are realistically equipped to resist U.S. government surveillance as privacy advocates 
assume. The results will also determine the capacity or willingness of firms to act as corporate 
avatars depending on how constrained firms are by their surveillance capitalism. Calo’s 
application of Affordance Theory substituting U.S.-based firms for U.S. citizens works because 
both firms and citizens have the same affordances at their disposal. However, firms are not 
simply citizens with more power and resources, therefore treating them as such oversimplifies 
their relationship to their environment. The exposure of U.S. government surveillance served as 
an interaction that changed the dynamic within the broader business environment forcing firms 
to adjust in order to survive. Affordance Theory will assist in measuring the manner in which 
firms adjusted to achieve desired outcomes and avoid undesired outcomes. In a complex 
adaptive system like a business environment, the actions firms take not only impact their own 
survival but also the viability of other stakeholders within the environment. Firms must consider 
their relationships with government, users, shareholders, and other firms when taking actions. 
The next section explains how Calo’s framework allows for the measuring of surveillance 
resistance methods executed by firms within their business environment. 
 
F.  Affordance Theory Framework 
 
Affordances are measured as negative or positive, perceptible or hidden, and true or false 
from the perspective of the organism being evaluated (Calo 2015, 4). All affordances are 
contextual, so the same affordance is measured differently based on the firm. Here are some 
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examples. The legal affordance may be positive for a larger firm with a dedicated legal team and 
negative for a startup with limited legal representation. The political affordance may be 
perceptible to larger firms with teams of lobbyists and hidden to smaller firms that 
underestimate the ability of industry associations to amplify their voice. The technical 
affordance may be true when firms implement a platform that facilitates a zero data retention 
policy, making it impossible for firms to hand over data, and false when firms use strong 
encryption leading to demands by federal law enforcement to hand over decryption keys putting 
the security of the entire platform at risk. The contingent nature of affordances allows for 
comparison between firms and business models to draw more insights from each firm’s actions. 
 
The legal affordance is applied through litigation. Firms use litigation to challenge 
application of existing statutes in individual instances or facially challenge a statute’s 
constitutionality. When the U.S. government requests consumer data from firms, the requests 
are often accompanied by a non-disclosure order preventing the firm from disclosing the details 
of the request or that the request was even received. Firms have used litigation to challenge for 
more transparency both in individual instances and in aggregate. Firms have also used litigation 
to challenge requests, primarily when the data is stored outside of the United States. 
 
The political affordance is applied through political influence. Firms use political influence 
by lobbying politicians to influence legislation governing issues of value to the firm. Issues range 
from general concepts like surveillance reform to specific legislation like the Email Privacy Act. 
Influence is not simply a quid pro quo exchange. The growth of corporate lobbying is more 
systemic, creating a drain of expertise from public to private sectors and making Congress more 
dependent on lobbyist data. Highly technical issues exacerbate these dependencies and allow 
the industry to frame issues and tailor increasingly complex legislation to fit firms’ needs. To 
counter adverse legislation that have legitimate support, firms participate in congressional 
committee hearings to influence legislation through testimony. 
 
The technical affordance is applied through encryption of both metadata and content or 
anonymization. Firms use different forms and applications of encryption across platforms. Some 
firms have adopted anonymization techniques to retain the benefits of analytics and improve 
their products without the data used for insights being identifiable to the consumer or the 
consumer’s device. The business models and exploitation of surveillance capitalism are 
determinant factors that influence how technical affordances are executed. 
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The market affordance is applied by leveraging the market pressure consumers place on 
firms to protect individual privacy. Calo’s application of the market affordance was citizens 
using collective public sentiment to place market pressure on firms, forcing firms to resist U.S. 
government surveillance on citizens’ behalf. This thesis will explore if loss of consumers could 
place shareholder pressure on firms to resist surveillance via the other affordances. 
 
This thesis applies Affordance Theory to the most dominant firms - Apple, Facebook, 
Google, and Microsoft - as the individual agents within the broader business environment to 
review how effective firms have been at resisting U.S. government surveillance. Each of these 
four affordances will be categorized as a positive or negative affordance based on the methods 
employed by each firm and the outcomes of each method. Affordances are contingent to the firm 
and the surrounding environment, so differences between firms may lead to different affordance 
categorizations. At times, positive affordances can prove to be false affordances depending on 
the anticipated desired outcome and the eventual undesired outcome. The results will determine 
which affordances offer the most desired outcomes for firms balancing the demands of complex 
adaptive systems to expand their market dominance, protect their surveillance capitalist models, 
and mitigate potential risks.  
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Chapter III. Application of Affordance Theory 
 
Methodology 
 
To measure benefits and dangers of each affordance method, the below resources have been 
reviewed. 
- Legal Affordance 
- Litigation 
- Resisting Non-Disclosure Orders 
- Resisting Data Requests 
- Political Affordance 
- Addressing Congressional Judiciary Committees 
- Coalition Letter 
- Congressional Hearing Testimony 
- Lobbying Disclosures 
- Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Resisting Government Surveillance 
- Public Sector/Private Sector Revolving Door 
- Lobbying Contributions to Applicable Bills 
- USA Freedom Act 2015 
- Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad (LEADS) Act 
- Email Privacy Act (EPA) 
- ECPA Amendments Act of 2015 
- Judicial Redress Act 2015 
- International Communications Privacy Act (ICPA) 
- Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act 
- USA Rights Act 
- USA Liberty Act 
- FISA Reauthorization 
- Technical Affordance 
- Encryption & Anonymization 
- Surveillance Capitalist Business Models 
- Network Architecture & Localization 
- Market Affordance 
- Review of Privacy Scandals 
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- Snowden Disclosures 
- Facebook Cambridge Analytica 
- Uber 
- Apple v. FBI 
 
“Top Firms” refers specifically to Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. These 
consumer technology firms are four of the five top technology firms by market capitalization. In 
addition, all four were named as complicit to NSA surveillance in 2013, creating a cross section 
of current market dominance and an ongoing stake in U.S. government data access. 
 
The legal actions reviewed were limited to publicly available filings or summaries that 
named one of the Top Firms. Publicly available filings may be limited because the FISC is a 
sealed court and NSLs often come with non-disclosure orders. 
 
The lobbying disclosures reviewed include filings from Q1 2014 to Q4 2017 for the Top 
Firms and a coalition called Reform Government Surveillance (RGS) that includes all four Top 
Firms and members. Contributions were aggregated across all filings and each filing was 
reviewed for relevant issues. 
 
Based on outcomes and expert opinion(s), each affordance will be categorized as a positive, 
negative, false, or contingent affordance for each firm. Once categorizations are measured, the 
following questions will be addressed: 
 
1. Which affordance(s) are most beneficial to which firms? 
2. Are firms capable and/or willing to fill the role of a corporate avatar? 
3. Does surveillance capitalism impact the methods firms choose to resist surveillance? 
 
PROPOSITION:  
 
The legal affordance will be most beneficial because multiple stakeholders can be considered 
and involved in crafting actions based on anticipated outcomes. However, firms are limited by 
their surveillance capitalist business models and will prioritize defense of their access to 
revenue-driving user data over the protection of individual privacy. Firms are poor corporate 
avatars. 
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A. Legal Affordances 
 
Legal affordances are leveraged through litigation. Non-disclosure orders and the third-
party doctrine limit the legal affordances of citizens while elevating that of firms. The Top Firms 
have challenged both U.S. government requests for data and non-disclosure orders that prohibit 
firms from publicly acknowledging requests or alerting the subject of the requests that a request 
was received. Tables 9 - 12 represent a summary of the eleven cases reviewed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of litigation as a form of resistance. The tables list all the cases including the most 
recent case description details; the type of surveillance resisted; whether the ruling was 
favorable or unfavorable to the firm; and the potential desired and undesired outcomes resulting 
from firms taking legal action to resist surveillance. Following these tables, this section will 
explore the impact of these cases in more detail. 
 
Table 9: Legal Affordance Outcomes for Multiple Firms 
Date Case No. Latest Court Type Strategy Outcome Desirable Undesirable 
1/27/14 13-03 
13-04 
13-05 
13-06 
13-07 
U.S. Foreign 
Intelligence 
Surveillance 
Court 
ND Prior 
Restraint 
F Transparency PRISM 
Speculation 
“ND” = Non-Disclosure, “DR” = Data Request, “F” = Favorable, “U“ = Unfavorable 
 
Table 10: Legal Affordance Outcomes for Facebook 
Date Case 
No. 
Latest 
Court 
Type Strategy Out- 
come 
Desirable Undesirable 
7/21/15 132 AD 3d 11 
30207/13, 
30178/14 
Appellate 
Division 
Of the 
Supreme 
Court of NY 
ND Open- 
Ended, 
Search 
& 
Seizure 
U Citizen 
Affordance 
Empower- 
ment 
Con’t 
Non- 
Disclosure 
Order 
Use 
9/14/17 17-SS-388 
17-SS-389 
17-SS-390 
D.C. Court 
of 
Appeals 
ND, 
DR 
Freedom of 
Association 
F Political 
Speech & 
Association 
Freedom 
Surveill- 
ance of 
Political 
Dissidents 
“ND” = Non-Disclosure, “DR” = Data Request, “F” = Favorable, “U“ = Unfavorable 
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Table 11: Legal Affordance Outcomes for Microsoft 
Date Case No. Latest 
Court 
Type Strategy Out- 
come 
Desirable Undesirable 
2/8/17 C16- 
0538JLR 
U.S. Dist Ct. 
Western 
District WA 
ND, 
DR 
Prior 
Restraint 
F Revised D.O.J 
Non- 
Disclosure 
Guidance 
Continued 
Non- 
Disclosure 
Use 
2/27/18 No. 
14-2985 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
DR Extra- 
territorial 
N/A Limits U.S. 
Gov’t Reach 
Abroad 
Localization, 
Protectionism 
“ND” = Non-Disclosure, “DR” = Data Request, “F” = Favorable, “U“ = Unfavorable, “N/A” = Not 
Applicable 
 
Table 12: Legal Affordance Outcomes for Google 
Date Case 
No. 
Latest 
Court 
Type Strategy Out- 
come 
Desirable Undesirable 
2/21/17 17-M- 
1235 
U.S. Dist Ct. 
Eastern 
District WI 
DR Cites 
MS v U.S. 
U Limits U.S. 
Gov’t Reach 
Abroad 
Localization, 
Protectionism 
4/19/17 16-mc- 
80263- 
LB 
U.S. Dist Ct. 
Northern 
District CA 
DR Cites 
MS v U.S. 
U Limits U.S. 
Gov’t Reach 
Abroad 
Localization, 
Protectionism 
7/10/17 16-4116 U.S. Dist Ct. 
NJ 
DR Cites 
MS v U.S. 
U Limits U.S. 
Gov’t Reach 
Abroad 
Localization, 
Protectionism 
7/31/17 16-mj- 
00757 
U.S. Dist Ct. 
D.C. 
DR Cites 
MS v U.S. 
U Limits U.S. 
Gov’t Reach 
Abroad 
Localization, 
Protectionism 
8/17/17 2:16- 
mj- 
01061- 
TJR 
U.S. Dist Ct. 
Eastern 
District PA 
DR Cites 
MS v U.S. 
U Limits U.S. 
Gov’t Reach 
Abroad 
Localization, 
Protectionism 
9/1/17 5:17- 
mj-532- 
HNJ 
U.S. Dist Ct. 
Northeastern 
District AL 
DR Cites 
MS v U.S. 
U Limits U.S. 
Gov’t Reach 
Abroad 
Localization, 
Protectionism 
“ND” = Non-Disclosure, “DR” = Data Request, “F” = Favorable, “U“ = Unfavorable 
 
Immediately following the Snowden disclosures, the Top Firms called on the government 
for increased transparency. The secrecy of FISA 702 resulted in increased public distrust and 
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allowed a presentation slide from the disclosures to generate accusations of backdoor access to 
firm servers. Firms used litigation to challenge for more transparency allowances. There are two 
forms of non-disclosure orders. 
 
The first form is a prohibition of disclosing aggregate data relevant to National Security 
Orders (NSO). NSO requests are typically accompanied by non-disclosure orders because of the 
sensitivity of national security investigations. FISA requests and National Security Letters are 
NSO. The Snowden disclosures implied that technology firms were providing the U.S. 
government direct access to their servers, so five technology firms (Google, Microsoft, Facebook, 
Yahoo, and LinkedIn) filed motions for declaratory judgement to allow the firms to disclose 
aggregate statistics2. Apple served as an Amicus on this filing3. This filing is reflected above in 
Table 9. Google’s motion stated that its “reputation and business has and continues to be 
harmed by the false or misleading reports in the media” and that “transparency is critical to 
advancing public debate in a thoughtful and democratic manner”4. An accompanying letter sent 
from Google’s Chief Legal Officer to then Attorney General Eric Holder and FBI Director Robert 
Mueller states that the non-disclosure orders prohibiting disclosure of the number of NSO 
requests fuel public speculation that the U.S. government had “unfettered” access to Google 
servers (Drummond 2013). The motivation of firms for fighting non-disclosure orders was 
directly related to the public perception that firms were complicit in allowing the U.S. 
government privileged access to global user data (Kopfstein 2013). That perception was 
leveraged by international competitors to dissuade non-U.S. markets into more protectionist 
policies, even incorporating U.S. surveillance into marketing campaigns (Castro and McQuinn 
2015). Challenging the non-disclosure orders was necessary to fight negative perceptions held by 
other relevant stakeholders like domestic consumers, non-U.S. governments, non-U.S. 
consumers, and global competitors. 
 
The five firms that initiated litigation for more transparent disclosure allowances 
described the non-disclosure orders as a prior restraint on speech. The prior restraint claim was 
based on the non-disclosure orders prohibition of communication of U.S. government requests 
for data in advance of any opportunity of communication to occur. Prior restraints on 
                                                
2 Op. at 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, 13-06, 13-07 (In Re Motion for Declaratory Judgement of a First 
Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders), (FISA Ct. 2014). 
3 Op. at (In re Motions for Declaratory Judgement to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders 
and Directives), Case Nos. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, 13-06, 13-07 (FISA Ct. 2013) (amicus curiae brief). 
4 Op. at 13-03 (In re Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgement of Google, Inc.’s First Amendment 
Right to Publish Information About FISA Orders), (FISA Ct. 2013). 
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expression, like communications, come with a presumption against constitutional validity 
especially when the suppressed speech is of [political and social] issues of public interest5. The 
lawsuit never reached a judgement. Instead, the five firms eventually agreed with the 
government to dismiss the actions in exchange for guidelines offered by the Attorney General 
allowing for aggregated disclosure (“Dear General Counsels” 2014). The agreement 
demonstrated the balance between the firms and the government and each party’s willingness to 
compromise in a way that allowed firms to claim that the government does not have unchecked 
access to data and still allowed for a level of opacity for the government given the national 
security implications of the NSO. It was mutually beneficial for firms and the U.S. government 
to demonstrate some measure of change to address public concerns. For firms, transparency 
would prevent a chilling effect on their users, who are necessary to fuel their surveillance 
capitalism. If many users are reluctant to use a firm’s service for fear of U.S. government 
surveillance, there is no incentive for new users to join. This demonstrates an example of 
negative network effects. Although transparency reporting could only reveal large aggregated 
blocks of requests, the reports show that requests were limited to a fraction of total users and 
that any access required the U.S. government to make a request to the firm. The U.S. 
government did not have uninhibited access to user data.  
 
The second form of non-disclosure order prohibits firms from alerting users when the 
U.S. government requests user data. Notifying users of data requests gives users the opportunity 
to defend themselves as the subjects of an investigation. Facebook has challenged law 
enforcement requests for data and, although the requests were not NSO, the warrants used were 
authorized by the SCA and Facebook’s challenges were constitutional in nature. Facebook 
challenged non-disclosure orders in two instances. The first case concerned the warrants issued 
for subscriber information and content of 381 Facebook accounts believed to be linked to a 
disability fraud investigation. This case is reflected in the top row of Table 10. In the New York 
Supreme Court, Facebook challenged the non-disclosure order, asserting Facebook’s First 
Amendment rights against an open-ended ban on speech. Facebook added that an open-ended 
ban ensures that the owners of the Facebook accounts would never be able to advocate for their 
Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonably secret search and seizure. Facebook was 
denied because the court felt the firm had no legal standing to challenge the constitutionality 
because Facebook was “simply an online repository of data and not the target of the criminal 
                                                
5 Id. 
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investigation”6. The court also felt that the disclosure of the warrants would risk an ongoing 
investigation7. The second case was also constitutionally focused and is reflected in the bottom 
row of Table 10. In a District of Columbia Appeals Court, Facebook moved to vacate the 
indefinite non-disclosure provisions of three warrants linked to protests that occurred on 
President Trump’s inauguration day. Facebook claimed that users were entitled to notice when 
their First Amendment rights to anonymous political speech and association were at stake. The 
motion was denied but the court amended the non-disclosure orders to expire thirty days after 
the government received the requested8. Eventually, the three warrants were jointly dismissed 
since the investigation had progressed while the orders waited appeal from Facebook9. In the 
first instance, Facebook’s challenge was summarily dismissed as Facebook was out of bounds 
advocating for constitutional rights of the individual consumer. In the second instance 
Facebook’s challenge advocating for the consumer’s First Amendment rights, while not 
completely successful, at least resulted in the court amending the order. 
 
In April 2016, Microsoft submitted a complaint for declaratory judgement asking the 
U.S. District Court of Washington at Seattle to declare Section 2705(b) of Stored 
Communications Act (SCA), which authorizes non-disclosure orders, facially unconstitutional. 
This case is reflected in the top row of Table 11. Microsoft stated that in a twenty-month period, 
federal courts had issued 3,250 non-disclosure orders with an indefinite timeline for two-thirds 
of them. Microsoft claimed that the non-disclosure orders violated the firm’s First Amendment 
rights to speak with their customers about government investigations in addition to failing strict 
scrutiny. To Microsoft, indefinite non-disclosure orders were a prior restraint on speech putting 
the onus on Microsoft to check with the court for relief with no expectation of resolution. 
Microsoft also claimed that the firm could vindicate the Fourth Amendment rights of their users 
since indefinite non-disclosure orders prevent users from knowing that their rights need 
defending. Then in February 2017, the government motioned to dismiss Microsoft’s challenges 
resulting in a grant in part and a denial in part. The court granted the motion to dismiss the 
Fourth Amendment challenge ruling that firms could not assert Fourth Amendment rights on 
behalf of another person, as with the Facebook case. However, the court denied the motion to 
                                                
6 Op. at 132 A.D.3d 11 (In the Matter of 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook Inc.), 14 N.Y.S.3d 23 
(N.Y. App. 2015). 
7 Facebook, Inc v. N.Y. County Dist. Attorney’s Office, No. 16 (N.Y. App. 2015). 
8 Facebook, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 17-SS-388, 17-SS-389, 17-SS-390 (D.C. App. 2017) (notice to 
potential amici curiae). 
9 Facebook, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 17-SS-388, 17-SS-389, 17-SS-390 (D.C. App. 2017) (joint motion to 
dismiss). 
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dismiss the First Amendment challenge, ruling that indefinite non-disclosure orders were both 
prior restraints and prohibitions of content-based speech with both requiring strict scrutiny that 
the orders failed to meet10. Microsoft’s challenge was successful in part. In October 2017, Deputy 
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein approved new guidance issued by the Justice Department that 
limits non-disclosure orders to less than a year with limited exceptions. Non-disclosure orders 
also need to be narrowly tailored and applied only when necessary. While Microsoft still 
advocates for new legislation, the new guidance is considered a win for technology firms which 
led Microsoft to drop the lawsuit. This guidance may be exactly what a Justice Department 
spokesperson described as a balance where the department can still protect the rights of citizens 
while allowing technology firms to maintain relationships with users (Nakashima 2017). 
 
Increased transparency helps refute any perceptions that the U.S. government has 
unbridled access to the Top Firms’ user data. Challenging excessive non-disclosure orders 
signals to users that the Top Firms are on their side and potentially offers users the ability to 
challenge the data requests themselves. Facebook’s mixed results across district courts will 
become a theme for the legal affordance. However, both the litigation for more aggregated 
transparency and Microsoft’s facial challenge to SCA’s non-disclosure provision resulted in a 
compromise between the Top Firms and the U.S. government. Litigation of non-disclosure 
orders resulted in desirable outcomes. The Top Firms have had far less success challenging the 
actual data requests through legal affordance methods. 
 
In September 2015, a 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals decision made Microsoft v. U.S a 
pivotal case concerning government requests for user data. This case is reflected in the bottom 
row of Table 11. Microsoft submitted a motion to quash an SCA authorized warrant issued for 
data located in a Dublin datacenter based on the user’s submitted country code. After the data is 
transferred to Dublin, almost all content and non-content data is deleted from U.S. data centers. 
Section 2703 of the SCA authorizes U.S. government warrants for data collected and stored by 
Electronic Communications Services (ECS), such as technology firms. Microsoft disclosed 
responsive information that was still being stored in the U.S., but the contents of the emails 
were stored in Ireland. Because the contents were stored outside of the U.S., Microsoft motioned 
to quash the warrant. However, the magistrate judge denied the motion, claiming that warrants 
issued under SCA authority operated more like a subpoena. The magistrate judge noted that the 
                                                
10 Microsoft Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No.16-0538 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2017) (order on 
motion to dismiss). 
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warrant was served on Microsoft and not law enforcement, and that Congress intended the 
warrant to obligate the recipient to “produce information in its possession, custody, or control 
regardless of the location of information”11. 
 
The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the magistrate judge and reversed the 
order, returning the case back to district court to execute Microsoft’s motion to quash. The 2nd 
Circuit Court of Appeals believed that a warrant requesting data from a server outside of the 
United States is an extraterritorial application of domestic law. Unless explicitly contrary, 
interpretation of U.S. law presumes an application within the territorial district of the U.S. to 
avoid conflict of law scenarios and international discord. Testing laws for extraterritorial reach 
requires two steps. First, the law is reviewed to determine if the SCA permits extraterritorial 
reach, which the government conceded was not the case. The second step is to determine if there 
was an extraterritorial application of domestic law. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals believed 
the focus of the SCA was on privacy and not to aid law enforcement, therefore invasion of the 
customer’s privacy takes place when the customer’s protected content is accessed in Ireland. 
Microsoft’s role in retrieving the data from the Ireland server meant that Microsoft was acting as 
an agent of the government which is an extraterritorial application. The 2nd Circuit rejected the 
theory that “foreign sovereign interests are unaffected” when a U.S. judge orders a service 
provider to ‘collect’ data, possibly belonging to a foreign citizen, and ‘import’ it into the United 
States from a foreign server simply because the service provider has a base of operations within 
the United States12. 
 
The 2nd Circuit’s decision could have had a profound impact on U.S. government access 
to data. If upheld, the SCA statute that authorizes electronic communication warrants would not 
be able to compel disclosure of personal data located outside of the United States, making 
surveillance of foreign actors very difficult for the U.S. government. Any requests for data stored 
by U.S.-based firms outside of the U.S. would require use of the MLAT system, nullifying the 
advanced position the U.S. government has over multinational U.S.-based firms. Dissatisfied 
with the 2nd Circuit’s decision, the U.S. government requested an en banc review. The review 
was denied 4-4, but dissenting opinions from the decision would subsequently influence lower 
court rulings in cases that cited the 2nd Circuit’s decision (Jacobs 2017). 
                                                
11 Op at. 14-2985, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, (In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-
Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation), Case No.14-2985 (2d Cir. Jul. 14, 
2016). 
12 Id. 
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Emboldened by Microsoft’s favorable 2nd Circuit ruling, Google challenged several 
requests for data stored outside the United States claiming that they were extraterritorial. 
Google cited the Microsoft decision in six separate districts, but none of the districts agreed with 
the 2nd Circuit decision. All six cases are reflected in Table 12. The district courts agreed in part 
with the 2nd Circuit that the SCA does not have extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, all six 
districts disagreed with the 2nd Circuit and ruled that both the querying of data at Google’s 
headquarters in California and exchange of data for review by law enforcement occurred in the 
United States. Therefore, execution of the warrants were domestic applications of the 
authorizing statute. In the Alabama and California districts, Google’s network architecture 
undercut any argument that copying or transferring data stored abroad to the U.S. impacted 
sovereignty. Google’s network shards data and distributes the shards globally for efficiency 
rather than storing data statically based on locality. Microsoft stored the user’s data in Ireland 
because that was the perceived location or nationality of the user13. A U.S. District Court in 
Wisconsin ruled on two cases challenging SCA warrants citing Microsoft, one of which had 
Google serving as the claimant. In its decision to issue the warrants, the court cited dissenting 
opinions from the U.S. v. Microsoft en banc request as persuasive analysis. The Wisconsin 
decision stated, “it should not matter where the ones-and-zeroes are stored” and that “what 
matters is the location of the service provider”14. A district court in the District of Columbia 
vehemently disagreed with the 2nd Circuit. The court described the 2nd Circuit decision as 
“erroneous” and “based on flawed reasoning.” The court went on further stating “...the Microsoft 
decision does little to protect customer privacy and succeeds only in pouring molasses on the 
ability of the government to conduct lawful criminal investigations to protect the public”15. 
 
Relying on the Microsoft decision has made Google’s success rate so poor that the company 
informed the Justice Department that it would no longer challenge Section 2703 authorized 
                                                
13 Op. at (In the Matter of the Search of Content that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google 
(No.45)), Case No. 16-mc-80263 (N.D. Cal. 2017).; 
Op. at (In Re Search Warrant Issued to Google, Inc.), Case No. 17-mj-532 (N.D. Ala. 2017).; 
Op. at (In Re Search Warrant to Google, Inc.), Case No. 16-4116 (D. N.J. 2017).; 
Op. at (In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to Google, In re Search Warrant No. 16-1061-M to Google 
(No.13)), Case No. 16-mj-1061 (E.D. Penn. 2017). 
14 Op. at (In re: Information Associated with One Yahoo email address that is stored at premises 
controlled by Yahoo, In re: Two email accounts stored at Google, Inc.), Case Nos.17-M-234, 17-M-1235 
(E.D. Wis. 2017). 
15 Op. at (In re Search of Information Associated with [Redacted]@gmail.com That is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc.), Case No. 16-mj-757 (D. D.C. 2017). 
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warrants (Kravets 2017). The 2nd Circuit ruling initially appeared to be a success for the Top 
Firms, but since the ruling is not binding in other courts, citing the 2nd Circuit has proven to be 
unreliable. 
 
The government petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the 2nd Circuit Microsoft 
case. The court accepted and heard oral arguments on February 27, 2018 (“United States v. 
Microsoft Corp.” n.d.). Depending on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, this affordance 
method could have resulted in both desirable outcomes and hidden undesirable outcomes. 
Microsoft’s Chief Legal Officer Brad Smith expressed concern in a blog post that if the Supreme 
Court reversed the 2nd Circuit decision and granted U.S. government access to data and content 
of foreign citizens regardless where the data is stored, non-U.S. governments may make 
reciprocal requests to the data and content of Americans, eroding privacy as each nation 
demands the same level of access. Smith also suggested that a reversal decision could result in 
more protectionist policies by non-U.S. governments given that their fears of preferential U.S. 
government access to their citizens’ data would be confirmed (Smith 2017c). At the same time, if 
the Supreme Court upheld the 2nd Circuit’s decision, non-U.S. governments may be 
incentivized to enact data localization policies. Data localization would have impacted firms and 
their stakeholders in desirable and undesirable ways. Non-U.S. users would have been able to 
avoid their data being reached by the U.S. government, but if their country has less restrictive 
privacy or surveillance regulation, localization would benefit the non-U.S. government with 
increased access (Granick 2016). Through localization, non-U.S. governments would publicly 
appear to be protecting their citizens from U.S. overreach while simultaneously making it easier 
to surveil their own citizens. Localization also favored Microsoft and other firms that have 
structured their network along country lines. 
 
Google’s challenges to warrants citing the 2nd Circuit Microsoft decision failed in part 
due to the difference in network architecture. Localization favors a data-location-centric 
approach. Since Google’s data is sharded and constantly moving from server to server all around 
the world, a favorable Microsoft ruling incentivizing localization may have actually been 
undesirable for Google (Woods 2017). Resisting data requests within the legal affordance 
presents potential undesirable outcomes for both favorable and unfavorable rulings. In his 
concurring opinion from the Microsoft v. United States judgement, 2nd Circuit Judge Gerard 
Lynch called for Congress to act because courts are ruling based on statutes that do not 
adequately address the issues presented to the court. Congress is not bound to binary 
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decisions16. In March 2018, the Department of Justice and Microsoft mutually agreed that the 
enactment of the CLOUD Act rendered Microsoft’s lawsuit moot (Jeong 2018). The CLOUD Act 
will be discussed further in the next section covering the political affordance. 
 
The legal affordance yielded mixed results for the Top Firms. Desirable outcomes were 
achieved when firms litigated for more transparency allowances, but not to the extent that the 
Top Firms initially anticipated. Even during the public distrust of government surveillance 
immediately following the Snowden disclosures, the Top Firms dropped their lawsuit and 
compromised with the U.S. government to limit NSO reporting to large blocks of request figures 
and reporting updates every six months on a six-month delay. The compromised transparency 
still achieves the desired outcomes for the Top Firms. Other stakeholders like U.S. citizens, non-
U.S. citizens, and non-U.S. governments have more visibility to data that was previously 
undisclosed. The request data and approval by the U.S. government to publicize relieves the 
firms of speculation that the U.S. government had unfettered backdoor access to user data. 
Similarly, Microsoft's facial challenge to indefinite non-disclosure orders led to new guidance 
from the Department of Justice, leading Microsoft to drop their litigation. Again, the Top Firms 
compromised by accepting more restrictive guidance in lieu of legislative restrictions. The 
concessions made in both cases reflect the need to consider all stakeholders in a complex 
adaptive system. The Top Firms were still able to achieve their desired outcomes. Actions that 
may have started using litigation forced the U.S. government to propose compromised solutions. 
The Top Firms adapted to the feedback rather than force their initial path and risk an 
undesirable outcome. 
 
The limits of the legal affordance are most prominent when the Top Firms litigated to 
resist data requests. Litigation is highly dependent on existing law and established precedent 
restricting the available actions and outcomes using the legal affordance. The third party 
doctrine prevents the Top Firms’ users from asserting Fourth Amendment rights, making users 
dependent on firms to protect their privacy. However, the above cases demonstrate that firms do 
not have third party standing to assert Fourth Amendment rights on behalf of their users either, 
so firms are simultaneously relied upon and prevented from challenging data requests based on 
Fourth Amendment constitutional protections. When the Top Firms resisted U.S. government 
data requests of data stored outside U.S. borders, the limitations of the legal affordance 
presented the risk of it becoming a false affordance and resulting in undesirable outcomes. The 
                                                
16 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No.14-2985 (2d Cir. Jul. 14, 2016) (concurring in the judgement). 
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legal affordance cannot consider the updated demands of multiple stakeholders, making 
litigation of decades old legislation fraught with unintended undesirable outcomes if pursued to 
completion. If the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled on the 2nd Circuit Microsoft appeal, regardless 
of the ruling’s favorability, there would have been many potential undesirable outcomes 
including increased localization demands or reciprocal laws granting non-U.S. governments 
access to data stored within the United States. Although the litigious action of Microsoft, and 
subsequently Google, was executed with a desirable outcome in mind, the complex adaptive 
nature of the business environment may have turned a seemingly positive affordance into a false 
affordance. By resisting data requests, the actions of firms under the legal affordance threatened 
other firms within their business ecosystem and outside stakeholders, such as non-U.S. citizens, 
within the broader business environment. 
 
The unpredictable and potentially undesirable outcomes of the rigid legal affordance 
may have actually been a net positive for the Top Firms’ business ecosystem and environment 
because of the high stakes for both U.S.-based firms and the U.S. government. Transparency 
resistance cases resulted in compromises which ended litigation prior to a ruling. Data request 
resistance cases were mostly unsuccessful in lower courts, but the Microsoft U.S. Supreme Court 
case had such high stakes that firms and lower courts advocated for a legislative solution. 
Passage of the CLOUD Act is the culmination of multiple stakeholders planning for a variety of 
plausible outcomes in a complex adaptive system. Despite the risks inherent to the legal 
affordance, desirable outcomes may be unintended feedback from litigious actions on the part of 
the Top Firms and the U.S. government. 
 
The Top Firms served as sufficient corporate avatars even if, at times, their capacity as 
corporate avatars occurred only when the needs of the firms were aligned with actions that 
supported individual privacy. Litigation for increased transparency and challenges to requests 
for data stored overseas were motivated by access to international markets and non-U.S. 
personal data assets. U.S. government surveillance access to foreign user data was utilized by 
non-U.S. competitors to threaten the global dominance of the Top Firms. Increased 
transparency allowances allowed firms to address and correct international speculation of 
backdoor government access. Conflict of law situations and protectionism were stated as 
motivating factors when resisting data requests. Microsoft’s U.S. Supreme Court case would 
have prevented conflict of law issues for Top Firms while other outcomes would have been 
detrimental to U.S. citizen and non-U.S. citizen privacy. Both forms of surveillance resistance 
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had surveillance capitalist motivations, but they also had desirable outcomes for individual 
privacy even if being a corporate avatar was a tangential outcome. The legal affordance actions 
that are less clearly defined are the data request refusals based on constitutional challenges. 
These First and Fourth Amendment challenges support the rights of users to defend their 
constitutional rights or the ability of Top Firms to defend constitutional rights on the user’s 
behalf. In these cases, the Top Firms appeared more altruistic with fewer obvious benefits to 
surveillance capitalism beyond gaining or retaining users based on a public commitment to 
privacy. 
 
B. Political Affordances 
 
The political affordance offers more benefits for firms because it lacks the constraints that 
complicated the legal affordance. When technology firms challenge data requests via litigation, 
the firms are limited by the existing governing statutes. The statute authorizing almost all 
requests is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) which was passed in 1986, 
predating the iPhone by over twenty years. Applying outdated legislation to a rapidly changing 
industry with global reach is impractical. The day that the government petitioned the U.S. 
Supreme Court to consider the Microsoft 2nd Circuit decision, Microsoft’s Chief Legal Officer 
Brad Smith wrote a blog post advocating for legislative solutions because a legislative process 
would involve “incorporating input from multiple stakeholders,” resulting in solutions that 
“consider the needs of law enforcement, the realities of modern technology, and the application 
of people’s traditional rights in today’s world” (Smith 2017a). 
 
Firms leverage political affordances by influencing legislators to write new laws or revise 
existing laws. Actions of political influence are exerted through lobbying or addressing relevant 
congressional committees on the issues with current legislation and suggesting reforms. The 
levers of influence possessed by firms set them apart from diffuse individual citizens when 
leveraging political affordances. Lobbying is more than presumptive quid pro quo transactions 
between firms and lawmakers. Political scientist Lee Drutman describes modern lobbying as 
being far more systemic. Corporate lobbying accounts for three quarters of lobbying activity. As 
firms invest more into lobbying expenses, they attract experienced staffers from the government 
to the private sector. Lobbyists with government experience can earn as much as double that of 
a member of Congress. Public to private migration leaves congressional staffers with little 
experience, making them highly dependent on information from experienced lobbyists who have 
  45 
brought expertise from government to firms. Complex policy topics covering technology and 
globalization increase the knowledge gap between government and firm lobbyists. Congressional 
staff sizes have been the same since 1979, leaving lawmakers with less experienced staffers 
covering increasingly complex policy issues with the same number of staffers as their 
predecessors had almost forty years ago. The complexity of policy further advantages firms by 
allowing for small provisions that benefit individual firms and make the overall policy even 
more complex. More complex policy benefits the most resourced stakeholders, likely firms, 
leading to less investment and resistance from the public. Firms also shape the knowledge base 
around Washington by funding think tanks and participating in associations that produce 
studies used by government staffers to support policy decisions (Drutman 2015, 3-34). 
 
Overall, the Top Firms have greatly increased lobbying spending over the past five years. 
Apple has more than doubled annual spending between 2013 and 2017. Facebook increased 
annual spending by almost 80 percent between 2013 and 2017. Google increased annual 
spending by only 28 percent between 2013 and 2017 but consistently spent twice that of the 
other Top Firms. Microsoft was the only firm that decreased spending between 2013 and 2017 
but still consistently spent more than Apple. Table 13 represent the Top Firms’ spend based on 
mandated lobbying disclosures since 2013, demonstrating the level of investment between firms 
and the increased perceived value of lobbying over time. The high investment in lobbying spend 
presumes a return on investment for firms indicating power and influence on lawmakers. Also, 
the more firms invest in lobbying, the more likely they will be able to attract top talent away 
from government to represent their interests. 
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Table 13: Lobbying Disclosure Spend for the Top Firms 
Source: “Lobbying Disclosure”. Office of the Clerk US House of Representatives, Accessed on 2017 Sep 15
 
 
After the Snowden disclosures, several U.S.-based technology companies formed an 
industry coalition called Reform Government Surveillance (RGS). This coalition includes all four 
of the Top Firms and is used to collectively express the types of surveillance reform these firms 
support. The coalition advocates for five reform measures. First, RGS suggests limitations of 
surveillance, including the end of bulk collection and requiring requests be targeted to specific, 
known users. Second, RGS suggests increased oversight, including an independent and 
adversarial court review, and public availability to significant court decisions (“Global 
Government Surveillance Reform” n.d.). The third RGS suggestion has been partially executed; 
RGS suggested transparency allowances for firms to disclose the number of requests received 
and suggested transparency reports for the government. Transparency allowances were earned 
via the legal affordance. Fourth, RGS advocates for the free flow of information, requiring a 
prohibition on localization requirements and other protectionist policies. Lastly, RGS suggested 
reforms to avoid conflict of laws situations and, if unavoidable, resolution on the part of the 
relevant governments. Table 14 demonstrates the RGS coalition’s lobbying spend that augments 
the spend of individual firms. 
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Table 14: Lobbying Disclosure Spend for the Reform Government Surveillance Coalition
 
 
The Top Firms all have lobbyists with prior government experience, and Table 15 helps 
demonstrate how firms value prior government experience. All four firms have greater than 57 
percent revolving door lobbyists. One of Google’s lobbyists, Susan Molinari, was a member of 
the House of Representatives from 1991 - 1997. The investments summarized in Tables 13 and 
14 contribute to the Top Firms’ abilities to hire lobbyists with government experience in order to 
maximize their impact on lawmakers. Table 15 also demonstrates that the lobbying firm 
representing the Reform Government Surveillance Coalition, Monument Policy Group, is also 
heavily staffed with revolving door lobbyists at 64 percent. 
 
Table 15: Revolving Door Lobbyists 
Firm Ratio of Revolving Door Lobbyists 
Apple 6 of 9 total internal lobbyists 
Facebook 4 0f 7 total internal lobbyists 
Google 8 of 13 total internal lobbyists (Includes former 
Congressperson) 
Microsoft 10 of 16 total internal lobbyists 
Monument Policy Group* 9 of 14 total hired lobbyists 
*Representing Reform Government Surveillance, Source: Open Secrets, Accessed on 2018 Mar 20 
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The Top Firms have invested significantly into lobbying to address a range of issues like 
copyright law, immigration, and surveillance. In October 2013, a coalition of technology firms, 
including the Top Firms, sent a letter to both the House Judiciary Committee and Senate 
Judiciary Committee calling for increased transparency to correct what firms consider 
speculation about government access following the Snowden disclosures. The firms advocated 
for better privacy protections and reforms for more accountability and oversight of surveillance 
programs. The USA Freedom Act was specifically endorsed as a positive step in a public 
conversation about privacy and security, and the firms offered to work with the committees and 
co-sponsor bills to support the effort (“An Open Letter to Washington” 2013). 
 
Executives prioritized surveillance reform and appeared before congressional 
committees to advocate for new legislation. In March 2013, Google’s Director of Law 
Enforcement and Information Security Richard Salgado testified in a House Judiciary 
Subcommittee hearing on “ECPA Part 1: Lawful Access to Stored Content.” Google’s testimony 
represented the concerns of the Digital Due Process Coalition created to push for ECPA reform. 
Members of this coalition include other Top Firms Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft as well as 
trade organizations and smaller firms (“Who We Are” n.d.). Salgado’s testimony introduces the 
problems created when a dynamic industry is governed by a statute that predates modern 
technologies by decades. The 2013 hearing focuses on privacy concerns of U.S. citizens. Salgado 
calls for reforms that offer more constitutionally protected privacy for users and clear guidance 
for firm compliance when faced with requests from law enforcement. Salgado emphasizes that 
applying an antiquated law to current technology and business practices creates confusion and 
uncertainty for law enforcement, firms, and courts alike (Salgado 2013). 
 
In June 2017, Salgado testified before the House Judiciary Committee again, but with 
two major additions to the 2013 testimony. First, the ECPA was a major focus of the more recent 
testimony, but Salgado drew attention to how the ECPA complicates cross-border data access. 
Salgado commended the House Representatives for unanimously passing the Email Privacy Act 
the previous year which addressed domestic concerns that were raised during his 2013 
testimony. However, the ECPA, now more than thirty years old, required additional reform to 
address global implications of the statute’s antiquated provisions. Second, when suggesting 
underlying principles that should be considered in legislation reforming the ECPA, Salgado 
pointed to recently introduced legislation that shared the same goals outlined in his own 
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testimony. During the testimony, Salgado described how the ECPA adversely affects the 
international markets of technology firms. In the same way the statute was unable to anticipate 
advances in technology, the writers of the ECPA could not anticipate the significant global reach 
of U.S.-based technology firms. To emphasize the inadequacy of litigation as a solution to 
address ECPA complications, Salgado states, “All of these courts are being asked to resolve 
individual disputes in ways that are divorced from sound policy decisions, without the robust 
opportunity for debate among a variety of stakeholders, and indeed potentially entirely in closed 
courtrooms” (Salgado 2017a, 4). Remember that Google fared poorly when resisting government 
data requests through the legal affordance. Salgado’s testimony envisions a path to reform as a 
path that considers and strives for equity between users, law enforcement, technology firms, and 
foreign sovereigns alike. Salgado acknowledged the potential of the bipartisan International 
Communications Privacy Act (ICPA), introduced in 2016 in both the House and the Senate, as a 
promising framework to update ECPA in a fashion that considers the needs of all relevant 
stakeholders. Salgado then proposed four refinements to improve the ICPA that addressed 
threats to cross-border data transfer, which is critical to Google’s Cloud Infrastructure (Hölzle 
2018). The first refinement proposed that data location be excluded as a determining factor 
governing access. The second proposed that notice be provided to countries when another 
country requests data belonging to a national or current resident of the former country. The 
third proposed redress and potential comity analysis should a country receive notice that 
another country is requesting data belonging to one of its nationals. Lastly, the fourth 
refinement proposes reciprocity agreements between countries who prescribe to the first three 
refinements (Salgado 2017a). All four refinements were foundational talking points when ICPA 
sponsor Senator Orrin Hatch spoke on the Senate floor less than a month after the House 
Judiciary Hearing (Hatch 2017b). 
 
Microsoft’s President and Chief Legal Officer Brad Smith also testified before the House 
Judiciary Committee on two occasions to address cross-border data requests. In February 2016 
and May 2017, Smith’s testimony also called for new legislation to replace the outdated ECPA 
but emphasized the costs at stake should Congress neglect to act or neglect to consider global 
data protection laws. Smith frames the international situation describing how application of 
outdated laws are resulting in unilateral and extraterritorial claims of legal authority creating a 
conflict of laws “on steroids.” Overreaching laws lead to other countries responding with data 
localization and retention requirements that leave technology firms in the middle choosing 
which country’s law to break. Smith offers the GDPR as a relevant example. The GDPR requires 
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that decisions made by courts or other administrative authorities requiring firms to disclose 
personal data to a requesting third country, like the United States, to be conducted via 
international agreement. Requests made by the U.S. government - like the request being 
reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Microsoft Ireland case - would present a situation 
where Microsoft could only comply to U.S. demands by violating the EU law and face penalties 
of up to 4 percent of their global revenue. A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) is an 
existing international agreement mechanism that is GDPR compliant, but has not been updated 
with technology advancements. MLATs are still completed on paper and lack standardization 
across agreements. In the testimony, Smith calls for modernization and standardization of the 
MLAT process as part of a complete overhaul of U.S. law and international agreements (Smith 
2016). Smith warned that inaction could threaten multiple stakeholders. U.S. firms are placed in 
conflict of law situations risking significant fines or encouraging protectionist policies that 
disadvantage U.S. firms internationally. Individual privacy is threatened globally as countries 
reciprocate unilateral and extraterritorial claims that ignore sovereignty. Legitimate law 
enforcement efforts are undermined by overbroad blocking statutes, like the ECPA, that 
disadvantage foreign law enforcement by forcing them to rely on inadequate international 
agreements (Smith 2017b). Smith’s testimony appears to focus much more on conceptual 
changes and emphasizes the risks of congressional inaction, which compliments Salgado’s 
reform suggestions. 
 
Salgado and Smith emphasized that the ECPA is outdated legislation, particularly with 
regards to the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The provisions of the statute indicate that the 
legislators in 1986 did not anticipate how pervasive stored communications would be three 
decades later, particularly with the advent of cloud services. The age of the ECPA is felt in two 
ways. First, the statute’s provisions govern access to remotely stored communications based on 
the age and status of the communication. For example, if an email is stored in the cloud and has 
been opened or is older than 180 days, the U.S. government only needs a subpoena to request 
the provider for those communications. A warrant is only required for un-opened 
communications less than 180 days old (“Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)” n.d.). 
These provisions reflect a pre-cloud computing era when storage was expensive and users stored 
communications locally. The result is electronically stored communications being more 
accessible to law enforcement than physical communications when the former has become the 
dominant method. The original privacy provisions of the ECPA were not protecting individual 
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privacy as intended because they still reflected an antiquated understanding of electronic 
communications. 
 
Second, pre-cloud computing ECPA legislators did not anticipate the global nature of 
electronic communications. Provisions intended to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens were 
written with insufficient specificity distinguishing domestic users of U.S.-based electronic 
communications providers and non-U.S. users. Interpretation of the provisions prohibits U.S.-
based providers from disclosing user data to non-U.S. governments even when law enforcement 
is investigating a crime committed outside of the U.S. with all parties being foreign nationals. 
This interpretation amounts to a blocking provision that requires non-U.S. governments to rely 
on diplomatic processes like Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) (Daskal 2016). The 
MLAT process is inefficient. Fulfillment can take up to ten months to complete and the U.S. 
receives three times as many requests as is filed with foreign governments (Nojeim 2015). The 
combination of global cloud computing market dominance of U.S. providers and the blocking 
statute nature of the ECPA provisions exacerbated the need for ECPA reform. Firms were caught 
between U.S. legislation that advantaged the U.S. government's reach to obtain foreign personal 
data while disadvantaging the ability for non-U.S. governments to access data belonging to their 
own citizens that happened to be collected and stored by U.S.-based firms. 
 
The Top Firms have expressed frustration with existing legislation and have used their 
lobbying resources to advocate for specific reforms of surveillance and cross-border data 
transfers. The enacted USA Freedom Act of 2015 was present as an issue on lobbying disclosures 
for Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. The USA Freedom Act primarily addressed FISA 
Section 215 telephony surveillance but also reformed electronic communications surveillance by 
requiring more transparency from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and requiring 
amici curiae to advise the court. Recipients of non-disclosure orders were also offered more 
allowances for reporting transparency (Lovells 2015). The Law Enforcement Access to Data 
Stored Abroad (LEADS) Act was present as an issue on lobbying disclosures for Facebook 
Google, and Microsoft. The LEADS Act would have reformed the ECPA by preventing the U.S. 
government from accessing data from U.S.-based “Internet Services” if the data is stored abroad 
and access violates the law of the country the data is located or the data is owned by a non-U.S. 
person. This would have required more U.S. government reliance on an inefficient MLAT 
process, so improvements to MLATs were included in the LEADS Act as well (Nojeim 2014). The 
ECPA Amendments Act was present as an issue on lobbying disclosures for Facebook, Google, 
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and Microsoft. The ECPA Amendments Act was more privacy focused than the cross-border 
access focused ECPA reform bill. This act would have prohibited voluntary disclosure of 
personal data to law enforcement by firms, eliminated the 180-day distinction for warrants, 
reformed delayed notice procedures to limit the use of non-disclosure orders, and established 
comptroller transparency and accountability. Notably, the ECPA Amendments Act would not 
have applied to the Wiretap Act or FISA (“Summary of Electronic Communications” n.d.). The 
Email Privacy Act (EPA) was present as an issue on lobbying disclosures for Apple, Facebook, 
Google, and Microsoft. The EPA amends the ECPA by eliminating the 180-day distinction 
between communications, essentially requiring a warrant for communications regardless of 
their age. The EPA passed unanimously in the House in 2016 but the Senate version was stalled 
when amendments that would broaden warrantless access in emergency requests and expand 
the power of National Security Letters were introduced (Myers 2017). The enacted Judicial 
Redress Act of 2015 (JRA) was present as an issue on lobbying disclosures for Apple, Facebook, 
Google, and Microsoft. JRA offers citizens of the EU rights of civil action and the same redress 
that U.S. citizens are be provided under the Privacy Act of 1974 (Bender 2015). The JRA was an 
essential part of the Privacy Shield agreement which replaced the Safe Harbor agreement that 
was invalidated after the Snowden disclosures. Privacy Shield allows companies to self-certify 
compliance for transatlantic data flows and is utilized by Facebook, Google, and Microsoft 
(“Privacy Shield List” n.d.). The International Communications Privacy Act (ICPA) was present 
on lobbying disclosures for Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. ICPA was introduced in both the 
House and the Senate in May 2016 (“S.2986” n.d.). The ICPA provided access to data of U.S. 
persons regardless of where the personal data was stored. If the personal data belonged to a 
non-U.S. person, the requesting law enforcement agency would be required to contact the data 
subject’s country of citizenship to offer the opportunity to object, prompting a comity analysis. 
To address the inadequacies of the MLAT process, the ICPA uses two strategies. The first 
strategy involved bilateral agreements between the U.S. government and a foreign government 
committing to reciprocal rights of access, notice, and challenge when each government requests 
data belonging to a citizen of the other government’s country. One such agreement has already 
been established with the United Kingdom (Hatch 2017b). Second, ICPA has provisions to 
update and improve the MLAT process, including the creation of an online docketing system for 
increased accessibility, transparency, and accountability (Hatch 2017a). 
 
The ICPA has recently been supplanted by the CLOUD Act introduced in February 2018 
by Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Doug Collins. Senator Hatch sponsored the ICPA 
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and the LEADS Act, making the CLOUD Act the most recent iteration of legislation addressing 
cross-border data access by law enforcement. The CLOUD Act was present as an issue on 
lobbying disclosures for Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft but has some notable 
differences from the ICPA. The CLOUD Act is similar to the ICPA in that both bills choose not to 
rely on the location of data to determine U.S. government access to data. The CLOUD Act places 
more responsibility on the firm. The firm can move to quash a warrant if the firm believes that 
complying with a data request would result in a conflict of laws, but explicit language of the bill 
restricts comity claims to non-U.S. governments who have established a bilateral agreement 
with the U.S. executive branch. Non-U.S. governments without a bilateral agreement are still 
eligible for common law comity motions to quash, but it remains to be seen how those will be 
handled differently. As with the ICPA, the CLOUD Act attempts to make non-U.S. government 
requests for data held by U.S.-based firms more efficient by allowing non-U.S. governments, 
who have an established bilateral agreement, to circumvent the MLAT process and request data 
directly from firms like the U.S. government is able to do. The exception being that U.S. citizens 
are offered more protections from non-U.S. governments requesting data than non-U.S. citizens 
are offered from U.S. government requests. The ICPA had provisions to improve the MLAT 
process where the CLOUD Act does not (Daskal 2018). The lack of MLAT reform could 
incentivize non-U.S. governments to agree to bilateral agreements with the executive branch 
that offer more expeditious data disclosure. 
 
The CLOUD Act may be supported by all four of the Top Firms, but the bill has faced 
opposition by several privacy and human rights advocacy groups including the ACLU, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Amnesty International. In a coalition letter, twenty-four 
organizations expressed their disagreement with “technology companies” who stated the 
CLOUD Act was progress in protecting human rights. The groups’ objections highlight the 
power given to the executive branch when choosing countries for bilateral agreements; the 
enhanced access to data by foreign governments that are considered more lenient than current 
U.S. law; and the power to challenge data requests to be solely at the discretion of firms with no 
resource for individual users (“Coalition Letter Opposing” 2018). Despite opposition from 
privacy and human rights advocacy groups, the CLOUD Act was included in a 2018 Omnibus 
spending bill passed by Congress and signed into law by President Trump to avoid a government 
shutdown. Privacy focused members of Congress, like Senators Ron Wyden and Rand Paul, 
objected to the inclusion because doing so precluded meaningful debate (Hatmaker 2018). 
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In 2017, thirty-one firms co-signed a letter to Representative Bob Goodlatte calling for 
reform of FISA Section 702. Suggested reforms included codifying limitations on “about” 
collection in the Upstream program, judicial oversight of government queries of Section 702 
collected data, narrowing the definition of “foreign intelligence information,” and increases in 
transparency and oversight (“Dear Chairman Goodlatte” 2017).  
 
After co-signing the May 2017 letter to Representative Goodlatte that suggested 
preferred reform measures for Section 702, the Top Firms were largely absent from the FISA 
reauthorization debate. The Top Firms were not invited as witnesses to testify at a Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary hearing in June 2017 or a House Judiciary Committee hearing in 
March 2017 covering FISA Section 702 expiration, reform, and reauthorization (“FISA 
Amendments Act” 2017; “Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act” 2017). Panel 
two of each hearing witnessed testimony from think tanks, law schools, private law practices, a 
former general counsel at NSA and former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, a 
professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, and Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board member. 
Some witnesses advocated for privacy focused reforms, but the absence of the Top Firms leaves 
out the testimony of key stakeholders. The Top Firms transmit communications that are caught 
in upstream collection and collect and store data that is requested via PRISM. Because their 
mass data collection makes them valuable targets, the Top Firms’ business reputations were 
called into question after the Snowden disclosures and the ramifications of perceived complicity 
with U.S. government surveillance continues to impact their ability to operate in non-U.S. 
countries. The inclusion of testimony from Top Firms would not have been unprecedented. 
Microsoft and Google testified in ECPA reform hearings covering similar subject matter - U.S. 
government access to data belonging to non-U.S. citizens. Apple testified as a witness at a House 
Judiciary Committee hearing covering encryption and the balance between privacy and security 
(“The Encryption Tightrope” 2016). 
 
In October 2017, the USA Rights Act and the USA Liberty Act were introduced to reform 
FISA 702 prior to reauthorization. The former bill included the U.S.-based firms’ suggestions to 
codify “about” collection restrictions, required warrants for backdoor searches of Section 702 
collected data and reverse targeting of Americans with exceptions only for emergencies, and 
increased transparency and oversight (“The USA Rights Act” 2018). As with the USA Rights Act, 
the latter bill also codifies the end of “about” collection and adds additional transparency and 
oversight mechanisms. Unlike the USA Rights Act, the USA Liberty Act adds less restrictive 
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limits on intelligence agency queries by exempting non-content data and queries that are not 
looking for evidence of a crime, which is considered a broad exemption (Reitman 2017b). Both 
the USA Rights Act and the USA Liberty Act included reforms that the Top Firms have publicly 
supported but neither was explicitly named in 2017 Q4 lobbying disclosures for any of the Top 
Firms. Rather, lobbying disclosures listed broader references to FISA 702. Apple’s lobbying 
disclosure listed “Issues related to government requests for data” (“Apple, Inc.” 2017). 
Facebook’s lobbying disclosure listed “reform government surveillance programs” and “Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Section 702” (“Facebook, Inc.” 2017). Google’s lobbying 
disclosure listed “Transparency related to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act” (“Google, Inc.” 
2017). Microsoft’s lobbying disclosure listed “Legislative proposals related to government 
surveillance and data collection, including issues of transparency and FISA reform” (“Microsoft 
Corporation” 2017). 
 
The Top Firms may not have lobbied for either the USA Rights Act or the USA Liberty 
Act explicitly, but they did support reforms within the bills. In October 2017, the coalition 
Reform Government Surveillance publicly expressed support for the USA Liberty Act but did not 
explicitly express support for the USA Rights Act (“Reform Government Surveillance Statement” 
2017). A month later, the coalition expressed “significant concerns” with the FISA Amendments 
Reauthorization Act of 2017 and its lack of meaningful restrictions on queries of Section 702 
collected data; lack of codifying the end of “about” collection; and an expansion of targeting 
allowances for U.S. government surveillance (“Statement on FISA Amendments” 2017). In 
January 2018, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 was passed by Congress and 
signed into law by President Trump extending authorization until 2023 (Liptak 2018). 
 
Table 16 summarizes significant bills related to surveillance reform and cross-border 
data access that have been explored in more detail throughout this section. 
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Table 16: Lobbied Legislation based on Lobbying Disclosures 
Bill Current State Lobbying Firms 
USA Freedom Act Became Law 2015 Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft 
LEADS Act Introduced 2015 Facebook, Google, Microsoft 
ECPA Amendments Act Introduced 2015 Facebook, Google, Microsoft 
Email Privacy Act Passed House, Stalled Senate Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft 
Judicial Redress Act Became Law 2016 Apple, Google, Microsoft 
Int’l Comm. Privacy Act Introduced 2017 Facebook, Google, Microsoft 
CLOUD Act Became Law 2018 Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft 
USA Rights Act Introduced 2017, 
Attempted Amendment to 
Replace S.139 FISA 
Reauthorization Act ‘17 
N/A  
*Facebook, Google, Microsoft have 
supported similar reforms but not 
explicitly this bill 
USA Liberty Act Introduced 2017 N/A  
*Facebook, Google, Microsoft have 
supported similar reforms but not 
explicitly this bill 
*RGS publicly supports 
Sources: “Congress.gov.” Library of Congress, Accessed on 2018 Mar 21; 
“Lobbying Disclosure.” Office of the Clerk US House of Representatives, Accessed on 2017 Sep 15 
 
The political affordance has been a predominately positive affordance resulting in more 
desirable outcomes to the Top Firms than the legal affordance. The Top Firms have invested 
millions into lobbying Washington and have recruited experienced former U.S. government 
staffers - including a former Congressperson - to staff the majority of their lobbying personnel. 
Investment in the political affordance has been a success. Issues and legislation lobbied for by 
the Top Firms have been enacted or progressed in Congress. Addressing congressional 
committees through letters and testimony has heavily influenced the framing and passage of 
legislation. The enactment of the CLOUD Act not only represented years of lobbying for ECPA 
reform, but also directly addressed the issue raised by the United States v. Microsoft case 
formerly before the U.S. Supreme Court. Political affordance actions can avoid the undesirable 
outcomes of the legal affordance because crafting legislation allows for a dialogue and 
consideration of multiple stakeholder needs in a complex adaptive business environment. 
Where the legal affordance is a more adversarial, zero-sum process with the U.S. government, 
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the political affordance includes multiple voices from the business ecosystem to find a balanced 
solution for the business environment as a whole. 
 
FISA 702 reform was difficult to rate. Compared to the investment in ECPA reform, the 
Top Firms were not active participants in FISA reform measures. This absence is more poignant 
when one considers that FISA 702 is the surveillance authority that was linked to the Top Firms 
in the Snowden disclosures and that FISA reform was explicitly suggested by both the EU 
Commission and the Working Party 29 to continue cross-border data transfers. It would be false 
to say that the Top Firms fully abdicated resistance to FISA 702 surveillance. FISA reform was 
listed on lobbying disclosures and the coalition Reform Government Surveillance (RGS) was 
actively representing the positions of the Top Firms and influencing the language in the FISA 
reform acts. However, these actions did not result in desirable outcomes. FISA 702 reform 
efforts lacked invitations to hearings on Capitol Hill and FISA 702 reauthorization lacked 
reform. Not only were none of the reform suggestions from RGS included in FISA 
reauthorization, but FISA 702 surveillance authorities actually expanded. The root cause of 
these outcomes is unclear. Was the power and influence of the Top Firms simply not enough to 
affect FISA 702 reform the same way the Top Firms influenced ECPA reform? Or did the Top 
Firms withhold that power and influence for a strategic reason? The Top Firms may have 
avoided drawing attention to FISA reform because of what is at stake in Europe. If the firms had 
little faith that Congress would enact reform measures that limit U.S. government surveillance 
allowances, they may have opted not to draw specific attention to FISA Section 702 flaws only to 
have those flaws continue without reform (O’Brien 2017). If avoiding attention was the 
motivating factor behind limited FISA 702 reform engagement, the Top Firms opted for a high 
risk strategy that ignores the principles of complex adaptive systems. Since 2012, 2017 was the 
first opportunity for debate, reform, or expiration of Section 702 (Richardson 2017). Presuming 
that FISA 702 reform efforts would fail and then choosing not to act in hopes that regulators 
would overlook the FISA reauthorization indicates that the Top Firms were not expecting 
surprise, limiting their ability to adapt. Instead, the Top Firms have allowed FISA 702 
surveillance to expand without another opportunity for reform for another five years, all while 
relying on EU regulators to act less punitive than if the Top Firms actually tried and failed at 
reform efforts. If the already undesirable FISA 702 reauthorization outcomes lead to more 
undesirable regulatory outcomes, it is hard to pin those failures on the political affordance given 
the desirable outcomes achieved in ECPA reform. The Top Firms failed to take advantage of a 
positive affordance. 
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Under the political affordance, the Top Firms served as poor corporate avatars. Support 
for privacy-focused reform bills like the USA Freedom Act, the ECPA Amendments Act, and the 
Email Privacy Act may reflect some commitment to individual privacy. However, at best those 
bills are beneficial to both the firms and individual citizens, reinforcing the belief that firms will 
only serve as corporate avatars when it suits them. Advocating for more restrictions to U.S. 
government surveillance benefits firms by establishing a public foundation of privacy advocacy 
while limiting the U.S. government’s reach, which has threatened the surveillance capitalist 
model. After the Snowden disclosures, firms were caught in between U.S. government security 
priorities and individual privacy rights. Laws that restrict the ability of U.S. government 
surveillance to request data remove firms from what had been a highly compromised position. 
When privacy is negotiated and informed through lobbying and public hearings, firms can enjoy 
the benefits of advocating for privacy while avoiding the hidden dangers or risks faced through 
the legal affordance. Low risk, high reward actions do not make for a true corporate avatar. 
 
The Top Firms’ support for the LEADS Act, the Judicial Redress Act, the International 
Communications Privacy Act, and the CLOUD Act has been less about individual privacy and 
more about cross-border data transfers. These bills limit U.S. government access to personal 
data either stored outside of the U.S. or belonging to a non-U.S. citizen and provide non-U.S. 
citizens with similar rights afforded to U.S. citizens under the Privacy Act of 1974. However, 
these bills are prioritized by the Top Firms because they resolve global issues that led to 
increased regulation, localization demands, and the potential for conflict of law situations. The 
Top Firms frame these changes as privacy focused because they are improvements to the 
existing issues created by an outdated ECPA. These improvements do more to relieve 
international state level tensions concerning data protection that have been troublesome for 
firms. Advocates of privacy and human rights believe the firms have fallen short in their role as 
corporate avatars. Twenty-four privacy and human rights advocacy groups strongly opposed the 
CLOUD Act despite the Top Firms saying the bill was privacy conscious. These groups claimed 
that the ability to circumvent the MLAT process as written in the CLOUD Act puts the privacy of 
non-U.S. citizens at risk. They also disagree with the reliance on firms to challenge data requests 
of non-U.S. citizens and believe recourse should be granted to the individuals targeted. Privacy 
and human rights advocacy groups agree that the ECPA is inadequate and have expressed 
support for ECPA reform (Turner 2017). They have publicly favored the more privacy focused 
Email Privacy Act (Cope 2017). With such prominent privacy and human rights groups strongly 
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opposing the CLOUD Act in ways never expressed about the LEADS Act or the ICPA, it is 
difficult to trust that the Top Firms truly had privacy in mind all along when they expressed 
unwavering support for the CLOUD Act’s provisions that are more focused on avoiding conflicts 
of law and easing international tensions than individual privacy rights. 
 
C. Technical Affordances 
 
Technical affordances are leveraged through engineering changes that limit or prohibit 
surveillance, specifically the use of encryption and anonymization. The Top Firms have the 
capacity to resist surveillance through technical means that impacts the legal affordance and the 
political affordance. When evaluating their role as corporate avatars, the approach toward the 
Top Firms will be more instructive than previous affordances because firms have more agency 
via the technical affordance. The ability of firms to resist surveillance via the legal affordance is 
highly dependent on existing law and applicable precedent. The ability of firms to resist 
surveillance via the political affordance is highly dependent on their ability to influence the 
political will of lawmakers. Being the Top Firms in the platform technology sector puts Apple, 
Facebook, Google, and Microsoft in a well-resourced position to unilaterally engineer 
surveillance resistant privacy technology into their platforms. However, privacy-by-design 
engineering may restrict both U.S. government surveillance and surveillance capitalism. Are 
firms willing to adapt their own business practices to stifle surveillance? How do differences 
between firms inform their approach to privacy? The technical affordance presents a unique 
situation where the surveillance capitalist models of firms is executed differently between firms 
depending on how each firm generates revenue. 
 
After the Snowden disclosures, the Top Firms used the technical affordance to respond 
quickly. To assure users the Top Firms would protect them, firms explained how encryption can 
protect privacy against upstream and downstream surveillance. Apple posted a message for their 
customers in June 2013 emphasizing that communication services like iMessage and Facetime 
are end-to-end encrypted, meaning Apple cannot decrypt the data and only the sender and 
recipient have the decryption keys (“Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy” 2013). Apple’s 
Mac OS and iOS support full disk encryption to protect the data on consumer devices. Apple 
iCloud data like photos, contacts, notes, and backups are encrypted in transit and all but mail 
are encrypted at rest (“This is How We Protect” n.d.). End-to-end encryption is available for 
iCloud services handling the most sensitive personal data such as payment information, 
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passwords stored in keychain, and Siri information as long as two-factor authentication is 
enabled (“iCloud Security Overview” n.d.). 
 
Microsoft announced expanded use of encryption and referred to government surveillance 
as an advanced persistent threat akin to malware or cyber-attacks. Microsoft’s changes included 
encrypting customer content in-transit between customers and Microsoft and between 
Microsoft’s data centers. These data in-transit changes were announced late in 2013 and were 
promised to be completed by the end of 2014. Data at rest stored by Microsoft was also 
encrypted and Microsoft discussed partnering with other companies to protect data going from 
one email communications service to the other (Smith 2013). Partnering with other email 
providers to encourage the use of encryption is beneficial for the Top Firms because if only one 
provider in email exchange is encrypting the communication in-transit, the email is vulnerable 
to surveillance (“Email encryption in transit” 2018). In 2018 Microsoft announced that end-to-
end encryption would be available for Skype calls and chats as a feature called “Private 
Conversations” using the same encryption system as a top secure messaging app called Signal. 
Note that unlike Apple’s Facetime, Microsoft’s end-to-end encryption is not the default and is 
designed as an additional feature. Microsoft will still have access to metadata from the 
conversation including when the conversation occurred and the duration, but the content will be 
inaccessible to Microsoft (Newman 2018b). Voice calls and chat in Skype were already encrypted 
in-transit although voice calls are stored unencrypted (“Does Skype use encryption” n.d.). 
 
In 2014, Google committed to always using HTTPS encryption in-transit when users send or 
receive emails and when Gmail data travels internally between Google servers (“Staying at the 
Forefront” 2014). Google was also the first major cloud service provider to use Perfect Forward 
Secrecy (PFS) encrypting data in transit between Google servers and other providers (“Security”, 
n.d.). PFS is even more surveillance resistant than other in-transit encryptions because PFS uses 
ephemeral session keys. With other forms of encryption, the same key can decrypt a great deal 
of the encrypted communication. In those cases, any encrypted data collected during upstream 
surveillance could potentially be decrypted if the key were ever compromised in the future. With 
PFS, those with access to the PFS keys cannot generate the same key used to initially encrypt the 
original session making collection of PFS encrypted data even less useful (Higgins 2013). 
 
Facebook set connections between users and Facebook to be encrypted by default using 
HTTPS. Facebook also forced their third-party developers to support HTTPS within a ninety-
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day period and committed to implement the same PFS encryption as Google (“Secure Browsing” 
2013). For the Facebook Messenger app, Facebook added an option to enable the same end-to-
end encryption system used in Signal that would eventually be incorporated into Skype. As with 
Skype, end-to-end encryption is not enabled by default, but the added privacy options still make 
the enhanced encryption accessible to the general public, giving users the option for stronger 
privacy protection (Greenberg 2016b). 
 
With the exception of Apple’s use of end-to-end encryption for iMessage and FaceTime, the 
Top Firms’ expanded uses of encryption were applied to in-transit data, at rest data that the firm 
can decrypt, or encryption requiring the user to opt in. None of these three encryption 
implementations materially limit the Top Firms’ access to valuable personal data assets. 
Encryption at rest protects data from unauthorized access, but if the firm controls the key 
management then the firm has access to the underlying encrypted data. Google positioned 
server side encryption of Google Cloud as a service that “frees you from the hassle and risk of 
managing your own encryption and decryption keys” (“Google Cloud Storage” 2013). If the firm 
controls the cryptographic keys protecting user data, it is vulnerable to National Security Letters 
or PRISM surveillance. Encrypting data in-transit diminishes the value of FISA Section 702 
upstream collection that monitors the internet backbone because it protects communications 
traveling between the user’s device and the firm’s servers (“HTTPS encryption” n.d.). The Top 
Firms can implement encryption in-transit and become more resistant to upstream surveillance 
without any negative impact on their surveillance capitalist business models, making it easier to 
implement encryption by default. 
 
It is noteworthy that Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple offered end-to-end encryption for 
services but required either opt in to the encryption itself or two-factor authentication. 
Requiring users to opt in to privacy settings rather than setting privacy as a default requires 
users to be informed and invested enough to opt in. This is an advantageous position for firms 
because the privacy features are available for the users most concerned about surveillance 
without locking the firm out of all user data that firms use to improve their platform and serve 
advertisements on behalf of clients. Most users do not opt in to privacy features that are not the 
default. According to a Google engineer speaking at a conference in January 2018, 90 percent of 
active Gmail accounts do not have two-factor authentication enabled (Ong 2018). By offering 
privacy features that only the most privacy conscious or informed users utilize, firms can 
  62 
position themselves as privacy conscious without losing broad access to valuable personal data 
assets. 
 
All four of the Top Firms exploit personal data and behaviors to maintain and expand their 
market position. Apple’s approach is different because, unlike Google or Facebook, Apple’s 
revenue is not driven by an advertising model. Instead, Apple leverages user data to build 
network effects that incentivize users to stay within a walled garden of only Apple hardware and 
services (Murphy 2017). Apple’s business model allows the firm to market privacy as a 
competitive advantage. A prominent section on Apple’s site is dedicated to privacy and states 
that Apple believes “privacy is a fundamental human right” and “great experiences don’t have to 
come at the expense of privacy and security” (“Apple Products are designed” 2018). The two 
Apple services that offer private end-to-end encryption by default - iMessage and FaceTime - are 
communication services that are only available within Apple’s iOS and OS X operating systems 
on Apple hardware. iMessage is one of Apple’s most effective walled garden services that 
incentivizes users and the people users communicate with to use only Apple products (Goode 
2016). The importance of using Apple services to drive hardware sales is evident in an interview 
where Apple CEO Tim Cook identifies Google, and not Samsung, as their primary competitor 
because Google’s Android operating system “enables” hardware firms like Samsung to compete 
with Apple. Later in that same interview, Cook addresses questions about surveillance by 
emphasizing that users are not the product and that Apple’s business is not based on having 
information about users (Colt 2014). Cook’s statement does not mean that Apple does not collect 
or utilize user data. Apple acknowledges that user information is critical to improving its 
business, but user privacy is an imperative (Greenberg 2017). Apple does not benefit from 
indiscriminate mass data collection the same way other Top Firms do by using that data to drive 
their business. Apple is vertically integrated and controls the full stack - hardware, software, and 
services - allowing them to collect only the data they need to improve that stack and implement 
collection with a privacy conscious approach when fortifying their network effects. 
 
In 2016, Apple began using a privacy focused technique called differential privacy. When 
both Mac OS or iOS users opt into sharing data with Apple to improve services, the data Apple 
uses to inform improvements undergo several steps to anonymize the data. First, device 
identifiers are dropped from the information. Next, statistical noise is added to cloud the user’s 
contribution on device and metadata is dropped. Finally, the clouded data is sent to Apple where 
access to that data is limited. The aggregate data from many users allows Apple to remove the 
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noise and retain the valuable insights without being able to de-anonymize user contribution. On 
top of the sharing process, Apple sets a daily budget limiting the contributions a user can 
provide to Apple. This prevents an active user with a statistically high number of contributions 
from theoretically providing enough data that the removal of noise allows for revelation of 
aggregate insights into that single user (“Differential Privacy” n.d.). As with the other Top Firms, 
Apple exploits user data to broadly improve hardware, software, and services to reinforce 
network effects. Unlike the other Top Firms, targeting individual users is not necessary to Apple 
the same way it would be for advertising or search engine optimization. This difference allows 
Apple to experiment with privacy focused techniques that may not be usable for other Top 
Firms. User data is still critical to Apple’s market dominance; the difference is how that data is 
exploited. 
 
Google and Facebook’s business models are based on leveraging user data for an advertising 
model, so their ability to implement privacy-by-design is more limited than Apple. For these 
firms, user information is used to optimize targeted advertising. Crucially, neither Facebook or 
Google sell user information to third parties (“Does Facebook sell my information” n.d.; “How 
Ads Work” n.d.). Selling a valuable asset like personal data would be counterproductive. Rather, 
Google and Facebook run their own ad networks that provide advertisers with tools for targeted 
advertising that are grounded in each firm’s collection of user data. For instance, Facebook’s ad 
targeting offers businesses the ability to target three types of audiences. First is a “core 
audience” that allows for targeting based on data like age, gender, location, and behaviors. 
Second is a “custom audience” of a business’s existing customers using data from customer 
relationship management (CRM) software like email addresses or phone numbers. Third is a 
“lookalike audience” that identifies personal data attributes and behaviors that match a 
business’s custom audience to reach new customers (“Choose Your Audience” n.d.). Facebook 
must be able to access their users’ identifiers in plain text to serve targeted advertising based on 
external plain text, making end-to-end encryption or even anonymization unworkable. 
According to Google’s Privacy Policy and User Terms, Google uses data points like location data, 
search terms, and advertising device identifiers to target ads for advertising clients. Server logs 
are “anonymized” by removing IP addresses and cookie information, but not until after nine to 
eighteen months (“Advertising” n.d.). 
 
Mass collection and exploitation of user data is so critical to Google and Facebook’s business 
models that any claims of privacy prioritization are diminished not only by a lack of privacy-by-
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design techniques, but also by each firm’s own actions. In June 2014, Google announced a 
project to build end-to-end encryption into Gmail. After three years, Google seemingly 
abandoned the project and made the code open source with sources inside Google claiming that 
the project received little support over time (Greenberg 2017). In 2016, Google merged the 
personal data it collected with anonymous site tracking data it owned after purchasing the ad 
network DoubleClick in 2007. Initially Google chose to keep its own data and the purchased 
DoubleClick data separately. However, facing enhanced targeting capabilities from other firms 
like Facebook, Google reversed that position, essentially identifying the previously anonymous 
tracking data. New users were opted-in by default. Existing users were opted-out by default, but 
invited to opt-in with prompts that emphasized “new features” and not de-anonymization 
(Angwin 2016). In 2013, Facebook acquired the Virtual Private Network (VPN) app Onavo and 
since 2016 Facebook has encouraged Android Facebook users to use Onavo via a “Protect” 
prompt. In 2018, iOS Facebook users were also offered a “Protect” prompt and were encouraged 
to use Onavo as a VPN. Shortly after appearing on iOS, researchers noticed that the VPN 
monitors and tracks users as they visit websites and use apps collecting and sending the data 
back to Facebook. A VPN is typically considered a privacy tool designed to limit the observation 
of user traffic. Trust is usually placed in the VPN with many providers choosing not to keep any 
logs as a privacy feature (Newman 2018a). Marketing a VPN using a prompt titled “Protect” and 
then collecting browsing and app usage data to fuel Facebook is a misleading promotion of a 
false privacy tool. Facebook and Google’s ad based surveillance capitalism limits both firms’ 
ability to resist surveillance using the technical affordance. Abandoned end-to-end encryption, 
de-anonymization of data, and misleading privacy tools that collect user data highlights the 
limits of privacy when faced with the insatiable desire for personal data in a targeted advertising 
model. 
 
Microsoft’s business model is not as easily parsed as Apple, Facebook, and Google. 
Traditionally, Microsoft’s revenue came from licensing its software to Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEM) who made the hardware. In 2015, Microsoft transitioned to a new 
strategy that competes on all technology fronts after falling behind Google and Apple in the 
mobile market. On one front, Microsoft is emulating Apple’s model of free software installed on 
Microsoft branded hardware to bring in new users and create their own walled garden 
ecosystem. On another front, Microsoft diverges from Apple’s model - using software and 
services to drive hardware sales - and leverages the user introduction to Microsoft’s software to 
upsell more premium versions via a subscription model. Services like cloud versions of 
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Microsoft Office would compete with Google’s productivity suite but with paid upgrades instead 
of a data for access exchange. Use of these services also exposes users to other Microsoft 
business lines like the Cortana voice assistant, Bing search, and Skype communications (Warren 
2015). A third front for Microsoft adopts a Google/Facebook model with the Windows Bing 
search engine, serving targeted advertising that offers location and device targeting as well as 
custom targeting where the client uploads existing customer identifiers (“Ad solutions for 
internet advertising” n.d.). User data is critical for Microsoft as the firm takes on the other three 
Top Firms. The walled garden and subscription revenue models require user data to improve 
software and services to compete with an established platform like Apple or a free platform like 
Google. The advertising model requires personal data to target advertising and compete with 
Google and Facebook, both of whom have platforms that encourage users to share. However, as 
Windows 10 rolled out, Microsoft faced criticism for deceptive tactics like forcing OS upgrades 
that increased the amount of data being sent from the user’s machine back to Microsoft if the 
user opted in to personalization via the voice assistant Cortana. After the forced OS upgrade 
process, users were prompted to opt-in to personalization that authorized location data, text 
input, voice input, and touch input to be sent back to Microsoft (Kalia 2016). Shortly after the 
initial rollout that caused the personal data controversy, Microsoft’s Windows 10 Anniversary 
update escalated the forced data collection by opting-in to Cortana by default and removing 
Cortana’s on/off button, thus forcing users to limit Cortana’s data collection in settings or to edit 
the Windows registry as a hack workaround (Chacos 2017). Mining user data became such an 
integral part of building Microsoft’s new business model to catch the other firms that it fractured 
user trust to obtain the data. Microsoft may make privacy claims by using industry standard 
encryption for data in-transit and at rest, but the means by which Microsoft chose to access user 
data calls their commitment to individual privacy into question (“Microsoft Trust Center” n.d.). 
By choosing both the Apple business model and the Google/Facebook business model, Microsoft 
put itself into a precarious competitive position. Microsoft will not be able to compete with 
Apple on privacy because their advertising component requires access to plain text personal 
data, but the subscription model and walled garden approaches limit the number of users 
Microsoft’s advertising can target. This results in an inferior product to Facebook and Google. 
Considering Microsoft’s disadvantaged market position and the deceptive methods employed to 
collect user data, it is difficult to trust that Microsoft will proactively implement more privacy-
by-design techniques to resist surveillance. Even when Microsoft added end-to-end encryption 
to Skype, the announcement was at least five years after the Snowden disclosures and it was 
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offered as a tool and not by default. In contrast, Apple offered end-to-end encryption in its own 
messaging and video calling services by default prior to the Snowden disclosures. 
 
Apple’s business model and commitment to privacy may allow for implementation of 
proactive technical affordance methods to resist surveillance, but there is potential for the 
technical affordance to become a false affordance. In his 2011 paper, Christopher Soghoian 
discussed the choice firms had to implement more encryption technologies. Soghoian wrote that 
if the firm encrypts user data without the ability to decrypt the data, the firm is not legally 
obligated to ensure the government has the ability to decrypt the data (Soghoian 2015, 9). Five 
years later, the FBI was prepared to bring Apple to court when the firm refused to build a 
software tool the FBI could use to break iOS full disk encryption. In a testimony before the 
House Judiciary Committee, Apple’s Senior Vice President and General Counsel Bruce Sewell 
defended the firm’s refusal stating, “Weakening encryption will only hurt consumers and other 
well-meaning users who rely on companies like Apple to protect their personal information” 
(Sewell 2016). Commenting on Apple’s refusal to comply, a former General Counsel of the NSA 
believed that if firms had the power to encrypt all user data, it comes with a responsibility to “do 
some of the work that had been done by the intelligence agencies” (Menn 2016). These two 
statements highlight the dilemma of privacy-by-design as both a strength and a weakness that 
protects the identity and communications of the public and bad actors alike. Techniques like 
encryption are ambiguous. Weakening encryption weakens it for everyone and strengthening 
encryption strengthens it for everyone (Rosen 2017). Privacy advocates like Soghoian can point 
to the Snowden disclosures and call on firms to implement better encryption in their products 
and services. However, if the balance between privacy and security swings too far to either side, 
the technical affordance can be revealed as a false affordance. Apple’s use of end-to-end 
encryption for communications and full disk encryption on its devices forced the FBI to push for 
a more drastic solution, thus creating a national debate. The Director of the FBI framed their 
encryption demand of Apple as justice for fourteen slaughtered victims whom America owed a 
professional investigation (Comey 2016). The Top Firms may be able to unilaterally implement 
privacy focused technical affordance actions to resist surveillance, but doing so does not 
guarantee the U.S. government will simply move on. Building privacy-by-design into a platform 
may be an effective action to resist surveillance, but the emerging feedback may necessitate 
escalation from stakeholders throughout the business environment. The U.S. government has a 
national security mission that is hampered by privacy-by-design techniques. The potential of 
U.S.-based technology platforms to serve as a surveillance resource has proven to be a valuable 
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tool for intelligence agencies and law enforcement. The reaction of firms and non-U.S. 
governments to the Snowden disclosures is a threat to the existing valuable resources of U.S.-
based electronic communications platforms. Additionally, surveillance resistant techniques like 
end-to-end encryption create potential safe havens for individuals who would otherwise have 
been surveilled. The U.S. government is unlikely to allow technology to become a net negative 
resource without some resistance. 
 
Encryption and anonymization are methods the Top Firms have at their disposal to resist 
surveillance depending on their willingness to adapt their business model or self-impose limits 
to their surveillance capitalist incentive structures. However, the technical affordance includes a 
privacy-by-design technique that, rather than being a mode of resistance, may serve as its own 
incentive for resistance. The threat of U.S. government surveillance was used opportunistically 
by non-U.S. governments to make localization demands of the Top Firms. Localization is 
positioned by governments as a means to achieve privacy and security but the motivation is 
sovereignty and access control. Localizing data would not limit surveillance as suggested. If 
coupled with data protection laws limiting access by foreign governments, localization may 
prevent the Top Firms from complying with data requests, but that does not limit the totality of 
surveillance. Centralizing data into fewer locations increases the risk of hacking as the method 
of surveillance. Non-U.S. governments with poor human rights records exploit the façade of 
privacy and security to legislate localization that offers them more access to their own citizens’ 
data (Sargsyan 2016, 2225-2230). 
 
Google’s distributed network architecture emphasizes security and efficiency to serve users 
at Google’s scale, but protectionism like localization threatens Google’s operations. Google’s 
network breaks up data files into smaller pieces and then stores, replicates, and moves them to 
enhance the network performance. Since the data is broken into smaller pieces that constantly 
move, isolating locations for data becomes difficult, helping to prevent unauthorized access like 
hacking but is incompatible with protectionism (Hölzle 2018). Localization demands 
fundamentally challenge the benefits derived from Google’s network. These threats have already 
appeared through the legal and political affordances. Google’s citation of the 2nd Circuit 
Microsoft decision presented complications for lower courts because the distributed network 
was incompatible with a sovereignty decision predicated on location of data, leading to an 
unfavorable result in all six lower court challenges. Google’s support for the CLOUD Act is 
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rooted in their desire to frame U.S. government access to data away from a location based 
approach (Hölzle 2018). 
 
The exposed actions by both the U.S. government and the Top Firms forced reactionary 
responses from non-U.S. governments to push for localization, either for protectionist or 
exploitative reasons. Executing a distributed network architecture can be threatening to firms if 
protectionism persists or escalates, particularly in the largest international markets. For firms 
like Google, use of that architecture increases the stakes of resisting surveillance to prevent non-
U.S. governments from enacting location based laws that are incompatible with the operation of 
their platforms. However, Google’s network architecture also limits their ability to resist 
surveillance in the first place, as seen in the legal affordance. Microsoft leveraged the fact that 
they store user data based on the stated location of the user to appeal a government request for 
data to the U.S. Supreme Court. Google’s architecture prevented them from successfully 
applying Microsoft’s position when challenging U.S. government requests in several courts. 
Having more storage flexibility protects access to international markets. Apple has been 
compliant with localization demands in China to protect access to that market. For all the 
benefits, a distributed network architecture comes with tradeoffs and risk for multinational 
technology firms. 
 
The technical affordance was a positive affordance for all firms when resisting upstream 
surveillance. All four Top Firms increased the use of encryption in-transit to limit the utility of 
monitoring the internet backbone. When the Top Firms implemented in-transit encryption like 
HTTPS, many of them set timelines for partners to implement HTTPS as well. The actions taken 
by the Top Firms can have desirable privacy outcomes throughout the business ecosystem. 
When the technical affordance was applied to resisting U.S. government requests for data 
through methods like National Security Letters or PRISM, the affordance was highly contingent 
on the surveillance capitalist business model of the firm. Apple’s walled garden model allows for 
stronger privacy-by-design and the use of privacy as a competitive differentiator. Facebook and 
Google’s targeted advertising models severely limited their ability to resist data requests using 
the technical affordance. Microsoft’s aggressive mixed model led to undesirable outcomes for 
both their surveillance capitalism and their ability to resist U.S. government surveillance. End-
to-end encryption and anonymization are inconsiderable for firms whose revenue is produced 
by selling access to users as the product. To offer the automated functionality of Facebook and 
Google’s efficient ad network, the firms require access to plain text personal data to cultivate 
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advertising based direct and indirect identifiers. End-to-end encryption or anonymization 
techniques would have undesirable outcomes on ad-based revenue businesses. Encrypting the 
data at rest or in-transit is beneficial to security, but not privacy in the context of government 
requests. As long as the firms have cryptographic keys to access the encrypted data, their users’ 
personal information is susceptible to government surveillance, thus making the technical 
affordance a net negative affordance for Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. 
 
The capacity of the Top Firms as a corporate avatar was also directly correlated to each 
firm’s surveillance capitalist business model. Technical affordance actions can be applied 
unilaterally, so any restrictions to the technical affordance are of the Top Firms’ own making. 
Apple publicly touts its commitment to privacy, which may be a competitive differentiator and 
an example of a firm serving as a corporate avatar when business needs align with individual 
privacy. However, Apple’s uses of technical affordance actions are the only examples across all 
affordances where the methods used to resist surveillance were at least partially out of line with 
the firm’s business interests. Apple’s use of encryption forced the firm into a public opposition 
with a federal intelligence agency making demands that legitimately threatened Apple’s privacy 
advantage. In the face of litigation with the Department of Justice, Apple chose individual 
privacy even when a majority 47 percent of PEW survey respondents who were iPhone users 
believed that Apple should comply with FBI demands (Doherty and Jameson 2016, 2). Privacy is 
clearly core to Apple’s business and platform when the firm is prepared to oppose both the U.S. 
government and its own users. 
 
Apple has proactively invested in technical affordance actions well before the other Top 
Firms. Their use of end-to-end encryption in their communications services predated the 
Snowden disclosures. In addition, Apple has invested in new privacy techniques to maximize 
their surveillance capitalist needs while limiting the exposure and collection of user data. In 
comparison, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft minimally served as corporate avatars. These 
firms’ targeted advertising models necessitate their access to user data, so any technical 
affordance actions implemented were either encryption that restricted only third party access to 
data or feature additions that were opt-in by default. Privacy conscious users were offered end-
to-end encryption in communications services as a feature addition to compete with Apple and 
smaller platforms like Signal. However, the feature requires the user to opt-in, thus setting 
limitations on the use of the end-to-end encryption functionality and preventing an undesirable 
outcome on the larger pool of advertising targets. Facebook, Google, and Microsoft also 
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demonstrated a need for user data that fractured trust in Top Firms as capable corporate 
avatars. Targeted advertising is an arms race that escalates the methods firms will employ to 
build more and more detailed customer profiles. Targeted advertising models restrict the 
technical affordance thereby restricting the role ad-based surveillance capitalists can serve as 
corporate avatars if they wish to compete with the other ad driven firms in their ecosystem. 
 
Evaluating the Top Firms as corporate avatars is difficult when considering network 
architecture. Distributed networks are more secure and private by design. On the other end of 
the spectrum, localization under more authoritarian governments may be presented as 
protective against foreign surveillance, but can often compromise the privacy rights of 
individuals at the hands of their own government. Google’s use of a distributed network is 
beneficial to individual privacy, but is also necessitated by Google’s needs at scale. Additionally, 
Google’s support for the CLOUD Act seems to be driven by threats to its own architecture. As 
mentioned in the political affordance section, the CLOUD Act was not supported by human 
rights or privacy groups. Apple’s willingness to abide by localization demands has been 
described as “Orwellian” by Amnesty International, but Apple believes that participation with 
China can influence privacy and human rights progress from the inside (Barron 2018; Strumpf 
2017). As with the other affordances, labeling Top Firms as corporate avatars proves to be a 
futile exercise. 
 
D. Market Affordances 
 
When Calo studied U.S. citizen use of the market affordance, he suggested that citizens 
collectively place market pressure on firms to resist surveillance on their behalf. Calo referred to 
this as a nested affordance where the citizen leverages the market affordance to resist 
surveillance through the firm. This concept is essentially Cover’s corporate avatar theory which 
Calo even cited in his paper. Although Calo was skeptical that the nested affordance would work 
in practice, the market affordance can be tested by observing how the business environment 
places market pressure on firms to prioritize privacy (Calo 2015, 13-15). Because all four Top 
Firms are publicly traded, if citizens left or boycotted a platform en masse, the cost of their loss 
may pressure shareholders to demand that firms resist surveillance. Unlike the prior three 
affordances, the market affordance will be measured primarily on anecdotal evidence that is 
tangentially related to a hypothetical scenario where U.S. government surveillance leads to 
privacy demands from citizens that warrant substantive action from the Top Firms. Considering 
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the current market dominance of the Top Firms, the Snowden disclosures had the opportunity 
to provide observable outcomes, but that scandal failed to provide market pressures strong 
enough to influence notable privacy changes. The first three affordances have demonstrated that 
firms are rarely sufficient corporate avatars, and are often influenced by their surveillance 
capitalist business models. In the absence of a real world example with observable outcomes, 
recent relevant controversies will be used throughout this section to provide context for a 
hypothetical situation. 
 
The 2013 Snowden disclosures were a major controversy that named U.S.-based technology 
firms as active participants in U.S. government surveillance programs. As discussed throughout 
this thesis, the repercussions of the disclosures are still being felt five years later. Following the 
disclosures, thousands of protesters rallied in Washington, DC to protest U.S. government 
surveillance (Newell 2013). This citizen unrest was not a precursor to sustained distrust among 
citizens as consumers of technology. In late 2014, the PEW Research Center surveyed 
respondents about privacy strategies post-Snowden. A minority of those surveyed were 
concerned about the government monitoring them while using technology. Thirty-eight percent 
were concerned about the government monitoring their email; 39 percent were concerned about 
government monitoring of their searches; and 31 percent were concerned about government 
monitoring of their social media. Even fewer of those surveyed were willing to change the way 
they used technology platforms. Eighteen percent of respondents changed the way they used 
their email accounts; 17 percent of respondents changed the way they used search engines; and 
15 percent of respondents changed the way they used social media (Rainie and Madden 2015, 4). 
Although the NSA documents implicated firms as arms of U.S. government surveillance, 
people’s technology habits remained predominantly unchanged even if they were more 
concerned about surveillance. This is reflected in user engagement performance indicator 
metrics as well. After the disclosures, much of the financial risk to firms came from abroad 
through protectionist policies and increased regulations. Overall, the Top Firms’ growth metrics 
and the value extracted from users were not negatively impacted. In 2013 Facebook recorded 
1.19 billion monthly active users which was an 18 percent increase over 2012 (Protalinski 2013). 
In 2014 Facebook recorded 1.35 billion monthly active users which was a 14 percent increase 
over 2013 (Protalinski 2014). In 2013 Apple sold 150.2 million iPhones, a 20 percent increase 
over 2012 (Abbruzzese 2014). In 2014 Apple sold 169.2 million iPhones, up 13 percent over 2013 
(Lowensohn 2013). The metric Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) reflects the monetization of 
users. Facebook’s Q4 2013 to Q4 2014 ARPU grew 31 percent from $2.14 to $2.81 and Google’s 
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Q1 2013 to Q1 2014 ARPU grew 7 percent from $42 to $45 (Garner 2015). Citizen distrust 
following the highest profile government surveillance scandal was not negatively reflected in 
user engagement. The emergence of the Snowden disclosures did not elicit feedback from 
consumers that would have potentially forced substantive change directed from shareholders to 
firms in response to diminished trust from consumers. 
 
In 2018 Facebook announced the suspension of analytics firm Cambridge Analytica stating 
that the firm had improperly obtained information belonging to 87 million Facebook users 
(Prokop 2018). The scandal has invited discussion of potential regulation of the U.S.-based 
platform technology industry. After Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified before both 
chambers of Congress, two data protection laws were announced. First, Senators Richard 
Blumenthal and Ed Markey introduced the Customer Online Notification for Stopping Edge-
provider Network Transgressions (CONSENT) Act. Markey framed the CONSENT Act as a U.S. 
response to the EU General Data Protection Regulation. The bill includes breach notification 
requirements, explicit opt-in consent requirements, and notifications if personal data is used. 
The FTC would handle enforcement (Brandom 2018). Second, Senators Amy Klobuchar and 
John Kennedy announced legislation that would allow users to opt-out of data tracking, require 
terms of service to be written in plain language, access already collected data, and have a privacy 
program (Deahl 2018). There is bipartisan support for data protection legislation reflective of a 
deterioration of trust with Facebook and technology platforms in general. However, there is 
skepticism that legislation will pass or that the final draft will be as protective as originally 
intended. Members of Congress expressed doubt that the current Republican-controlled 
Congress would be able to pass regulatory legislation with midterm elections at the end of the 
year (Timberg 2018). A former congressional staffer commented that even if the proposed laws 
made it to a vote, they may look very different once the Top Firms begin lobbying lawmakers. 
The Obama administration introduced the Consumer Data Privacy framework in 2012. Even 
after the Snowden disclosures, lobbyists for U.S.-based technology firms modified the bill so 
much that consumer privacy groups ultimately opposed the 2015 discussion draft (Bedoya 
2018). Executives of the Top Firms have expressed openness to impending regulation, but they 
are already telegraphing their desire to frame it through caveats in their language. Apple CEO 
Tim Cook said “well-crafted” regulation was probably necessary (Welch 2018). During his 
testimonies, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg said he would not oppose the “right” regulation 
and that he would work with Congress to “flesh it out” (Kelly 2018). It will be up to citizens to 
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prove to lawmakers that data protection legislation needs to be truly representative of consumer 
protection and is an issue they will vote on. 
 
Loss of consumer trust has led to social movements to leave platforms. Facebook’s 
Cambridge Analytica scandal has prompted a #deletefacebook campaign. It is too early to 
determine how impactful such a movement will be, so other movements could be instructive. In 
2017, Uber’s many controversies led to #deleteuber campaigns stemming from exploitation of 
protests, an internal culture of sexual harassment and assault, the CEO verbally abusing one of 
the firm’s drivers, a tool used to evade regulators and law enforcement, and an executive who 
stole medical records of a rider who was a rape victim (Alba 2017a). Also, Uber suffered a data 
breach of 57 million driver and rider accounts that was hidden by paying off the hackers and 
making them sign non-disclosure agreements (Isaac, Benner, and Frenkel 2017). In January 
2017, Uber received up to 500,000 account deletion requests in one week after the firm was 
accused of taking advantage of a New York City Taxi work stoppage related to protests of 
President Trump’s Muslim ban (Isaac 2017). The weekend following the start of the #deleteuber 
campaign, Uber competitor Lyft’s app was downloaded more than Uber for the first time in 
Lyft’s history (Hawkins 2017). A consulting firm study showed 81 percent of respondents were 
aware of repeated Uber scandals with 27 percent, triple previous data, having negative 
perceptions of Uber (Siddiqui 2017). All these issues point to a consumer backlash for Uber’s 
negative public image. However, even with multiple controversies and an anti-Uber movement, 
only 4 percent of respondents switched ride hail apps even though the respondents felt all ride 
hail apps were the same (Siddiqui 2017). Uber went on to record 4 billion rides during 2017 
alone after having just recorded the milestone 5 billion all time rides in May 2017. In January 
2018 Uber reported 75 million monthly active users with 15 million rides per day (Bhuiyan 
2018). Lyft ended up benefitting from Uber’s 2017 scandals to a degree, doubling rides over the 
previous year. However, even at that milestone, Lyft recorded 375.5 million rides in 2017 which 
is 9 percent of Uber’s 2017 ride total (Carson 2018). For Uber, the social movement boycott 
amounted to minimal damage despite an entire year worth of negative media coverage. 
 
So far, this section has focused on the costs of not prioritizing privacy, but perhaps there are 
benefits to being privacy focused. In 2016 Apple refused to cooperate with the FBI’s request to 
access the iPhone of a San Bernardino shooter. The Department of Justice claimed that Apple’s 
refusal to comply was motivated out of concern for Apple’s business model and public image. 
CEO Tim Cook describes privacy as a “key value” for Apple (Benner and Mozur 2016). Former 
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CEO and co-founder Steve Jobs had been vocal about privacy before his death in 2011 having 
said:  
Privacy means people know what they’re signing up for in plain English and repeatedly. 
That’s what it means. I’m an optimist. I believe people are smart and some people want 
to share more data than other people do. Ask them. Ask them every time. Make them tell 
you to stop asking them if they get tired of you asking them. Let them know precisely 
what you’re going to do with their data (Farnsworth 2018).  
 
Cook has confronted shareholders when questioned about Apple acting on their values. 
At a 2014 shareholder meeting, a member of the National Center for Public Policy Research 
(NCPPR) challenged Cook after a NCPPR resolution was voted down, suggesting that 
investment in environmental measures should be driven by return on investment (ROI) only. 
Cook replied saying that shareholders that wanted Cook to make decisions purely for ROI 
reasons should get out of their stock (Shankleman 2014). During the public debate with the FBI, 
Cook addressed shareholders saying, “We've been in the news lately, and some of you may have 
some questions on that. We do these because these are the right things to do. Being hard doesn't 
scare us” (Lien and Dave 2016). Apple’s decision to defy the FBI may not be the hard stance that 
Cook perceived. Opinion polls published within a week of each other in February 2016 showed 
majority opinions for and against Apple. One of the polls returned that 20 percent of 
respondents did not know what to think (Carmen 2016). Throughout 2016, Apple’s share prices 
did not reflect their strong privacy stance. At one point in the first half of 2016, Apple’s shares 
were 30 percent below the high from the year before. Market analysts linked this decline to 
underperforming iPhone sales at the end of 2015 (La Monica 2016). The shares recovered in the 
second half of 2016, reaching its highest level since December 2015. The boost to share prices 
was credited to rival Samsung Galaxy Note 7 phones having battery explosion issues 
(Balakrishnan 2016). Apple’s commitment to privacy is a core part of their brand. The dispute 
with the FBI was a highly publicized privacy stance that denied the U.S. government a tool that 
could allegedly threaten the privacy of every iPhone user. However, as much public debate and 
coverage as this issue has garnered, the public appears to be highly conflicted over Apple’s 
position. Because Apple’s share value appears to be far more reliant on iPhone sales than 
controversy, consumers would have to drastically modify their purchase behaviors in favor of, or 
opposed to, Apple’s privacy values. 
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From the examples above, determining if consumers could apply market pressure to force firms 
to resist government surveillance has proven be a difficult task. The complex adaptive nature of 
the business environment makes it difficult to even find trends between scandals. Apple’s 
privacy stance did not appear to have an impact on the short term, reflected either through 
public opinion or in share prices. The counterfactual of this dispute may have been more 
illustrative of how privacy could impact share prices forcing investors to pressure Apple. What if 
Apple had eventually ceded to the FBI or lost the litigation and were forced to provide an 
unlocking tool? After all the rhetoric from Apple claiming that such a tool would compromise 
every iPhone, would iPhone sale projections be low enough to dramatically drop the value of 
Apple’s shares? This scenario is even more compelling knowing that Samsung’s battery 
explosion issues boosted Apple shares in anticipation for the 2016 holidays. What if consumers 
were forced to choose between an iPhone that had all of its privacy benefits stripped or a 
Samsung phone that could potentially explode? That scenario would demonstrate just how 
much consumers value Apple’s culture of privacy. 
 
It is too early in Facebook’s current Cambridge Analytica scandal to glean much insight, 
but the parallels to Uber’s many scandals may be informative. Like Facebook, Uber is a 
multinational U.S.-based technology platform firm that has built its business on disruption and 
operated with little to no regulation. Both firms demonstrated poor data governance and failed 
to publicly report the loss of data belonging to tens of millions of users. Both firms have a social 
movement boycott hashtag. Both have highly visible founder CEOs. However, that is where the 
similarities end. Although Uber does not have the size or stature of Facebook, the scandals 
involved were more salacious and were constant throughout an entire year. Uber ended up 
losing several executives who were active participants in the firm’s scandals. Despite all the 
negative headlines, purported loss of consumer trust, chaotic internal leadership and 
governance, and notable competitors, Uber recorded milestone numbers for 2017. For a brief 
period, they lost a statistically small number of users who may have defected to their rival, but 
long term consumer unrest was not sustained. The inability to negatively impact firm revenue 
removes even the potential for shareholders to place pressure on firms to resist surveillance. 
 
Facebook may be different. CEO Mark Zuckerberg was summoned to testify before 
Congress. None of Uber’s executives were brought to Capitol Hill. Depending on how it is 
drafted, impending regulation is a legitimate risk to the Top Firms. However, if regulation is the 
only response to the Facebook scandal, then U.S. citizens benefited from the political affordance 
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and not the market affordance. It is unclear if the market affordance will place significant 
pressure on Facebook to change. Facebook’s dominance likely contributes to the scrutiny of this 
scandal, but that dominance was established and fortified by network effects built on surveilling 
users. Facebook has potentially years of communications with large networks of family and 
friends. Facebook’s network effects are designed to make the decision to leave the platform 
come at tremendous personal cost. There are also few alternatives. Potential social media and 
communications competitors Instagram and Whatsapp were acquired by Facebook. The absence 
of direct competition makes it more difficult to #deletefacebook than it was to #deleteuber, and 
not many users deleted Uber. 
 
In time, investor filings may reveal that Facebook lost a significant number of active 
users, and perhaps the share prices will reflect those losses. Facebook’s shares have declined 
during the scandal, particularly when the FTC announced an investigation into Facebook to 
determine if the firm violated the consent decree from 2011 (Ortutay 2018). Some investors are 
suing Facebook to make up for these losses, claiming that the firm "made materially false and 
misleading statements” (Larson 2018). Fortunately for Facebook, the outrage may be 
dampened. After Zuckerberg’s testimony before Congress, Facebook’s share price improved 5 
percent (Molla 2018). The price is still down 11 percent compared to before the scandal, but as 
time passes and Facebook drifts out of the news cycle, perhaps the share price will continue to 
improve. Some analysts are saying that investors can take advantage of irrational pessimism 
that is driving down Facebook share prices to purchase stock, which will rebound in a few news 
cycles, at a discount (Kam 2018). If Facebook does suffer significant user losses and no new data 
protection laws are enacted in the U.S., it would be interesting to see what steps Facebook would 
take on their own to restore user trust. 
 
If the Top Firms were implicated in a Snowden level scandal involving U.S.-based 
surveillance, the business environment would produce a great deal of emergence and feedback. 
With the passage of the CLOUD Act and the spread of data protection laws around the world, 
U.S. government surveillance that requested data from U.S.-based firms belonging to a foreign 
national would likely produce legal and political conflicts that would preclude the necessity for 
consumers in that country to pressure shareholders. If the surveillance targets were in the EU 
but outside of the United Kingdom, the firm may be subject to a fine of 4 percent of global 
revenue and the business ecosystem would suffer from the de-authorization of transatlantic data 
transfer mechanisms required to operate businesses in the EU. If the surveillance targets were 
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in China, the penalties for the firm may be a ban from operating in the country and/or fines. 
Given the size of these two markets, both of these scenarios would achieve the goal of pressuring 
shareholders but to a greater extent that includes fines and a possible loss of entire markets, not 
just a critical mass of consumers boycotting as part of a movement. The movement would not be 
necessary. If the surveillance targets were U.S. citizens, there might need to be a critical mass of 
boycotting users. It is unlikely that the U.S. government would punish U.S.-based firms for 
complying with surveillance requests from their own government. If more than one firm is 
implicated, would that shift the public outrage to the government? If only one firm is implicated, 
and hypothetically another firm resisted surveillance, the complicit firm would likely be singled 
out under tremendous scrutiny. The nature of the targets would likely impact the boycott. If the 
surveillance was of a marginalized group or otherwise partisan in nature, the degree of outrage 
may be accelerated. However, as seen in the Apple FBI dispute, if the targets were proven to be 
nefarious actors, the public may have diverse reactions making it more difficult to build a critical 
mass. 
 
If there were enough losses to pressure shareholders into forcing firms to resist 
surveillance, the firms could use the legal or political affordances, but those affordances are 
prolonged processes. The legal affordance may require challenges for every request and the 
results could vary among the lower courts. The political affordance may have support assuming 
that the government is also facing backlash, but because legislating considers all stakeholders, 
the final bill may take time to be enacted or may not be sufficient to prevent all types of 
surveillance. The most effective affordance would be the technical affordance. The technical 
affordance does not depend on other parties for implementation and the unilateral nature could 
be beneficial to convince users of a newfound commitment to resist surveillance. However, in 
the absence of the other affordances, the technical affordance would require encryption that 
prevented even the firm from accessing the data. For firms like Google or Facebook, the loss of 
users would become a willing tradeoff to protect the revenue stream that sustains the firm.  
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Chapter IV. Results 
 
The following tables summarize the findings of this thesis covering the broader 
application of Calo’s modification of Affordance Theory to evaluate the utility of the four 
affordances - legal, political, technical, market - when resisting U.S. government surveillance. 
 
Tables 17 - 18 summarize the outcomes of Affordance Theory applied to the resistance of 
surveillance. Table 17 compares the ability of U.S. citizens to the ability of U.S-based technology 
platform firms to resist surveillance. The U.S. Citizens column reflects the conclusions from 
Calo’s original use of Affordance Theory. Calo believed that firms would be better equipped to 
resist surveillance. The U.S.-based Firms column reflects the findings of this thesis. Table 18 
summarizes the outcomes achieved by firm and affordance. 
 
Tables 19 - 20 summarize the capacity of each Top Firm to serve as a corporate avatar. 
Each table is broken down into the legal, political, technical, and market affordances. The 
market affordance row is generalized to the firm’s business model. 
 
Table 17: Outcomes of Affordance Theory - U.S. Citizens v. U.S.-based Firms 
Affordance U.S. Citizens U.S.-based Firms 
Legal Limited by the Third Party Doctrine 
and Non-Disclosure Orders 
Challenges to Non-Disclosure Orders led to 
desirable outcomes. 
Challenges to data requests had high potential 
for false affordance and undesirable outcomes. 
Desirable outcomes 
Political Citizens are diffuse and less focused 
than special interest groups 
ECPA reform led to desirable outcome. 
FISA reform unclear. 
Less risk than legal affordance. 
Technical High barrier to entry, lack of 
expertise 
In-Transit Encryption led to desirable 
outcomes. 
Highly dependent on surveillance capitalist 
business model. 
Market Reliant on firm willingness to serve 
as corporate avatars 
Low probability that consumer distrust leads 
to undesirable shareholder value and pressure 
from investors. 
Limited by business model. 
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The Top Firms were more resourced and influential than U.S. citizens, but the firms were 
operating in a more complex environment. Under the legal affordance, U.S. citizens are highly 
dependent on firms because of the third party doctrine and the use of non-disclosure orders. 
The Top Firms’ legal challenges to the use of indefinite non-disclosure orders allowed U.S. 
citizens to at least be notified that their information had been requested by the U.S. government, 
regardless of whether the request led to a charge. The citizen may not be able to claim a Fourth 
Amendment violation because of the third party doctrine. Firms cannot do so on the citizen’s 
behalf because they do not have third party standing. Both U.S. citizens and firms need to use 
the political affordance to resolve scenarios where legal restrictions limit the firm’s ability to act 
on behalf of the user. 
 
The political affordance illustrates the disparity between U.S. citizens and the Top Firms. 
There is not only an information asymmetry between firms and citizens, but also between firms 
and lawmakers. Firms have invested tens of millions in expenditure to recruit former 
government employees to lobby Capitol Hill. This poaching drains expertise from the 
government and transfers it to the firm, creating an information asymmetry that U.S. citizens 
typically do not have. Firms can also sustain legislative lobbying for years and through several 
iterations of bills where U.S. citizens may not. 
 
Clearly, the Top Firms are far better equipped to leverage the technical affordance. In 
some instances, the effort may be required from both citizens and firms. Some firms added 
privacy focused features, but these features either required opt-in selection or action on the part 
of the user to achieve the desirable outcome. The addition of new features may reduce the 
barrier to entry citizens experience when trying to leverage the technical affordance on their 
own. If the firms are offering the tools, learning to use them may be more accessible to citizens. 
 
The ability of consumers to put market pressure on firms to incentivize surveillance 
resistance has been aided by technology and has not produced results in past privacy focused 
scenarios. Threatening a firm’s business model by deleting the app or otherwise opting out could 
force investors to pressure firms on the citizen’s behalf. To date, there have been no examples of 
this occurring.  
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Table 18: Outcomes of Affordance Theory - Affordance Categorizations by Firm 
Firm Legal Affordance Political Affordance Technical Affordance Market Affordance 
Apple N/A - Amicus Only ECPA - Desirable, 
FISA - Undesirable 
Upstream - Desirable. 
PRISM - Desirable 
TBD 
Facebook ND - Desirable 
DR - Undesirable 
ECPA - Desirable, 
FISA - Undesirable 
Upstream - Desirable. 
PRISM - Undesirable 
TBD 
Google DR - Undesirable ECPA - Desirable, 
FISA - Negative 
Upstream - Desirable. 
PRISM – Undesirable 
Network a Liability 
TBD 
Microsoft ND - Desirable 
DR - TBD 
ECPA - Desirable, 
FISA - Undesirable 
Upstream - Desirable. 
PRISM - Undesirable 
TBD 
“ND” = Non-Disclosure, “DR” = Data Request, “N/A” = “Not Applicable”, “TBD” = “To Be Determined” 
 
Firms achieved desirable outcomes resisting surveillance to limit U.S. government access 
to non-U.S. citizens. A combination of the legal affordances and the political affordances led to 
ECPA reform that limits the reach of the U.S. government outside of the United States and helps 
prevent conflict of law situations that produce undesirable outcomes. 
 
ECPA reform demonstrated the complexity of the business environment that firms 
occupy. Years of lobbying and multiple iterations of ECPA reform bills progressed to varying 
extents in Congress, all while Microsoft continued challenging a request for data in Ireland that 
was appealed all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. No matter the ruling, there would have 
been potential for undesirable outcomes across the business ecosystem because of the rigid 
nature of litigation. These undesirable outcomes were averted by the inclusion of the CLOUD 
Act in an omnibus spending bill that rendered the U.S. Supreme Court case moot. If the CLOUD 
Act had to go through normal procedure, would it have passed, and would it have done so 
without significant revisions? Firms and the U.S. government alike celebrated the passage of the 
CLOUD Act, but it is highly dependent on bilateral agreements between the executive branch 
and non-U.S. governments. At this point, there is only an agreement with the United Kingdom. 
The Top Firms should be lobbying the executive branch to push more agreements as data 
protection laws around the world are implemented. 
 
The technical affordance most clearly demonstrated the impact of surveillance capitalist 
business models on the actions firms choose to resist surveillance. Google, Facebook, and, to an 
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extent, Microsoft’s business models limit them when resisting surveillance. These firms rely on 
access to personal data as fuel for ad targeting revenue streams. Because Apple operates a 
completely different business model and is vertically integrated, Apple can find a balance 
between access to user data and the use of privacy-by-design functions like encryption and 
differential privacy. Apple’s commitment to privacy and willingness to resist surveillance 
escalated a dispute with the FBI. Google, Facebook, and Microsoft may be limited in their ability 
to innovate on privacy, but if Apple pushes too far they risk another escalation either with the 
U.S. government or even a less human rights oriented country like China. Apple has been 
deferential to China, but if China demanded the same tool that the FBI wanted, either choice to 
comply or not would put Apple in a very precarious position. In a complex adaptive 
environment, Apple may not be able to predict, but it needs to prepare for a situation where 
strong resistance to surveillance leads to backdoor or encryption key demands enacted into law. 
Or Apple needs to prepare for the opposite scenario where an inaccessible iPhone could 
reasonably have prevented a major incident like a terror attack or mass shooting. Apple’s 
willingness to comply with localization demands is in contrast to Google whose distributed 
network necessitates surveillance resistance to limit protectionism. Both firms are making 
business driven decisions based on access to international markets or scalable efficiency with 
privacy as a byproduct. 
 
The market affordance served as a nested affordance for the other three affordances. 
There have not been examples to date that suggest that consumer distrust or dissatisfaction over 
privacy violations could lead to a critical mass of lost users to pressure firms into resisting U.S. 
government surveillance at the expense of their business model. This is not to say that public 
pressure has no impact on firms. Public outrage related to privacy issues like a breach or sale of 
data can lead to feature changes, public apologies, resignations, and policy changes. Resisting 
U.S. government surveillance adds another variable to the business environment. U.S. 
government surveillance is authorized by law and sometimes includes court orders requiring a 
firm’s compliance. Resisting U.S. government surveillance to avoid loss of users and loss of 
shareholder value adds its own costs and firms risk undesirable outcomes that may require 
balancing with the threat of lost consumers. Firms whose business model is fueled by ad based 
surveillance capitalism are at greater risk because the same collection and exploitation of data to 
drive revenue is what makes the firm an attractive source of surveillance. Implementing more 
privacy-by-design techniques to protect users could inhibit the revenue fueling access to 
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personal data. These firms may be forced to play defensively through lobbying to limit 
overreaching or clandestine surveillance. 
 
Table 19: Apple as a Corporate Avatar 
Affordance Capacity as a Corporate Avatar 
Legal Served amicus for increased transparency. 
Political Supported the CLOUD Act, not supported by privacy groups 
FISA reform efforts led to undesirable outcome. 
Technical Walled garden business model with control over stack allows for privacy focused 
techniques. 
Some end-to-end requires two factor enabled. 
Localization compliance risks privacy even with best intentions. 
Market Walled garden business model with control over stack allows for privacy focused 
techniques. 
Experience standing alone resisting surveillance against FBI. 
 
Table 20: Facebook as a Corporate Avatar 
Affordance Capacity as a Corporate Avatar 
Legal Litigated on behalf of individual First and Fourth Amendment rights. 
Political Supported the CLOUD Act, not supported by privacy groups. 
FISA reform efforts led to undesirable outcome. 
Technical Targeted advertising business model limits to only in-transit encryption. 
End-to-end messaging requires opt-in. 
Demonstrated deceptive tactics to collect user data. 
Market Targeted advertising business model limits ability to resist surveillance. 
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Table 21: Google as a Corporate Avatar 
Affordance Capacity as a Corporate Avatar 
Legal Focus on cross-border data access and ECPA reform. 
Political Supported the CLOUD Act, not supported by privacy groups. 
FISA reform efforts led to undesirable outcome. 
Technical Targeted advertising business model limits to only in-transit encryption. 
Merged large datasets that de-anonymized the personal data. 
Distributed network architecture benefits individual privacy. 
Market Targeted advertising business model limits ability to resist surveillance. 
 
Table 22: Microsoft as a Corporate Avatar 
Affordance Capacity as a Corporate Avatar 
Legal Litigated on behalf of individual Fourth Amendment rights. Non-disclosure order 
challenge resulted in desirable outcome. 
Focus on cross-border data access otherwise. 
Political Supported the CLOUD Act, not supported by privacy groups. 
FISA reform efforts led to undesirable outcome. 
Technical Combination walled garden, subscription, targeted advertising business model limited to 
in-transit encryption. 
End-to-end Skype limited feature that requires opt-in. 
Aggressive tactics to collect user data. 
Market Targeted advertising portion of business model limits ability to resist surveillance. 
 
Apple was the most capable corporate avatar of all the Top Firms because of the walled 
garden business model. Apple was less engaged in the legal affordance, serving only as amicus 
on the multi-firm litigation for more transparent reporting after the Snowden disclosures. There 
were no publicly available cases where Apple challenged data requests authorized by ECPA or 
FISA. Apple was also less engaged using the political affordance. The technical affordance and 
the market affordance are where Apple stood apart from the other firms. Apple’s walled garden 
business model, privacy focused techniques, and marketing privacy as a core value is not 
coincidental. Apple’s vertical integration allows for privacy techniques that limit collection, 
retention, and storage of user data in a minimal and anonymized fashion. Because Apple can 
benefit from surveillance capitalism in a controlled fashion that limits collection based on only 
Apple’s needs, privacy can be marketed as a core value and used as a competitive differentiator. 
Apple could monetize their users’ data, but it appears Apple does not have to nor wants to. 
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Apple’s business model would be beneficial should they ever be implicated in a U.S. government 
surveillance scandal again. If a mass collection of users were going to leave Apple’s walled 
garden, Apple is not only equipped to technically resist surveillance, but they have also proven 
that they will stand alone against the FBI. The only scrutiny of Apple as a corporate avatar 
comes from their cooperation with non-U.S. government that have a track record of human 
rights and privacy violations. Apple seems to be much more willing to serve as a corporate 
avatar against the U.S. government as opposed to other firms. 
 
Microsoft and Facebook are less capable as corporate avatars than Apple, but both were 
more capable than Google. Both firms used the legal affordance to litigate for constitutional 
rights of users. Facebook challenged warrants that they considered overbroad and potentially 
chilling to political speech and the right of assembly. Microsoft challenged the indefinite use of 
non-disclosure orders which allows individuals to be notified about being surveilled. Both firms 
attempted to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of their users but were denied third party 
standing. Both firms were also part of the multi-firm group that challenged for more 
transparency allowances. As with Apple, the technical affordance demonstrated how each firm’s 
business model determines their capacity as corporate avatars. Microsoft’s multi-faceted 
business model limited their ability to implement privacy-by-design techniques. The end-to-end 
encryption available in Skype was available years after the Snowden disclosures and only as a 
feature requiring user opt-in. Facebook’s targeted advertising business model significantly limits 
their ability to implement privacy-by-design techniques and incentivizes indiscriminate mass 
data collection. Both firms used deceptive or aggressive tactics to collect data from users. The 
business models of both firms compromise their ability to adapt if a mass collection of users was 
going to leave their platforms after either firm was implicated in another U.S. government 
surveillance scandal. Facebook’s current scandal with Cambridge Analytica could reveal more 
about Facebook’s capability to adapt. 
 
Google was the least capable corporate avatar. Google’s use of the legal affordance was 
solely focused on protection of cross-border data transfers and ECPA reform to avoid conflict of 
laws scenarios. Like Facebook, Google’s targeted advertising business model significantly limits 
their ability to implement privacy-by-design techniques and incentivizes indiscriminate mass 
data collection. Google also merged two large datasets after having stated that they would keep 
them separate, effectively de-anonymizing one of the datasets. Google’s business model 
compromises their ability to adapt if a mass collection of users threatened to leave the platform 
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should Google be implicated in another U.S. government surveillance scandal. The one benefit 
to their willingness as a corporate avatar is Google’s network architecture. Protecting against 
localization demands of non-U.S. governments requires resistance to U.S. government 
surveillance. The distributed network also has built-in privacy benefits. 
 
The findings demonstrate how limited the current Top Firms are when resisting U.S. 
government surveillance. Operating in an unregulated industry for decades has allowed for 
tremendous growth that is built on business models that are largely antithetical to individual 
privacy. The importance of building network effects to establish and reinforce dominance places 
exponential value on personal data assets, thus limiting the ability of firms to adapt and better 
resist surveillance. 
 
For firms whose revenue is generated by targeted advertising, transitioning to a 
subscription model where their revenue comes directly from the user offers more opportunities 
for resistance. Personal data assets would still be at a premium because network effects would 
be just as important to establish consistent subscription revenue, but because firms would only 
need to exploit personal data to improve their own platform they would have much more 
flexibility to implement privacy-by-design techniques and data governance. Focusing on their 
own platform may allow firms to iterate on their services in the same way that Apple’s business 
model has allowed them to use differential privacy to anonymize data while retaining the ability 
to extract valuable insights, though they would be more limited than current insights. If firms 
are not selling an advertising platform used by a diverse client base to target individuals, there is 
less incentive for firms to indiscriminately collect data that is not directly relevant to product 
iterations. However, a transition to a subscription based model would still leave firms reliant on 
surveillance capitalism so even though gains would improve their overall privacy posture the 
impact on surveillance resistance may be minimal.  
 
A transition to a subscription model as a way to implement more privacy-by-design 
features may not be feasible for firms that generate revenue primarily through services 
compared to Apple’s vertically integrated business driven by hardware sales. The competitive 
advantage of firms like Google and Facebook is that the same data collection that fuels targeted 
advertising also differentiates their services from upstarts, establishing strong network effects. 
Unless data can be anonymized while still being tailored to an individual, the firms would 
sacrifice their competitive advantage while simultaneously limiting their user base to those who 
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are willing to pay subscription fees. If a new service emerged with a targeted advertising model, 
users may see more benefit to a more tailored service that is also free to use. This would 
essentially be the opposite of the market affordance findings. The current network effects of 
firms prevent users from impacting shareholder value enough to influence surveillance 
resistance at times of crisis. If firms proactively dismantle their network effects, they could be 
adversely impacting shareholder value to protect the privacy of users who have not 
demonstrated a willingness to protect their own privacy beyond voicing dissatisfaction. Google 
and Facebook have spent years establishing dominance in digital advertising that has led to 
their market capitalization. It would not make sense, from a business perspective, to dismantle 
their businesses to marginally resist surveillance. 
 
If firms are to adapt to the changing privacy landscape and make privacy a dominant 
priority when resisting surveillance, they would have to diminish the reliance on any 
surveillance capitalist model. Firms could establish alternate revenue streams that operate 
independently and are not predicated on exploitation of personal data assets. Microsoft and 
Google are potentially setting themselves up for success in a privacy conscious world by 
investing in cloud infrastructure. Amazon has dominated the market by leveraging the internal 
infrastructure competencies necessitated by their business to offer those same services to 
external organizations and developers (Miller 2016). Google and Microsoft have followed 
Amazon’s lead. At 10 percent, Microsoft has only a quarter of the public cloud market share as 
Amazon, but Q4 2017 reported a 97 percent increase year over year. Google is third in market 
share at close to 4 percent but had a Q4 2017 growth rate of 85 percent (Coles n.d.). Google has 
invested $30 billion in cloud infrastructure over the past three years (Miller 2018). While it may 
take time in an increasingly competitive market, Google and Microsoft’s diversification is 
establishing metaphorical insurance policies while surveillance capitalism invites increasing 
scrutiny. Diminishing the reliance on monetizing personal data assets may provide firms with 
more flexibility to resist U.S. government surveillance through the implementation of more 
privacy-by-design features that are enabled by default, thus significantly decreasing the 
collection and retention of personal data assets. Critically, if there were ever another U.S. 
government surveillance scandal or standoff, firms who transitioned their primary revenue 
source away from surveillance capitalism could respond to public scrutiny or stand up for public 
privacy by altering their privacy techniques in ways that would have previously threatened their 
revenue producing data collection. 
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To avoid risks to surveillance capitalism, firms could turn the public concern over U.S. 
government surveillance on the government itself. In the same way that Apple frames their 
relationship with China, firms could simply state that they are merely abiding by U.S. law while 
placing emphasis on digital sovereignty. Passage of the CLOUD Act has already provided some 
protection for firms against conflicts of law. When addressing domestic concerns over 
surveillance, public outcries could be redirected at the government in the same way that Apple 
framed the encryption debate as the FBI jeopardizing the privacy of everyone using an iPhone.  
 
Firms that offer free services funded by targeted advertising could frame any surveillance 
resistance changes as a tradeoff that would require a subscription model to continue operating 
at the level users expect. For example, if Google adopted this approach, it would be a choice 
between the U.S. government legislatively constraining surveillance authorities and Google 
needing to transition to a subscription model where users would have to pay for what had been a 
free service. This method may absolve firms of an untenable role as a corporate avatar. 
 
As surveillance capitalism is called into question by individuals and governments 
worldwide, new firms face difficult choices in markets that are currently dominated by 
surveillance capitalist firms. The emergence of privacy focused and punitive data protection 
regulations worldwide have increased the operating costs of compliance and the financial risk of 
non-compliance. If a new firm operates outside of the United States, any U.S. government 
surveillance requests may threaten critical cross-border data transfers or result in punitive fines 
that firms cannot absorb during growth stages. Resisting U.S. government requests to avoid 
regulatory risks is not a feasible alternative. New firms likely lack the resources for prolonged 
litigation or lobbying methods of the legal and political affordances. Not to mention that this 
thesis demonstrated that those affordances were by no means guaranteed, even with the 
resources and influence of a Top Firm like Apple or Google. 
 
Technical affordances would be more accessible to new firms, but would come with their 
own limitations and risks. The security and efficiency benefits of a distributed network 
architecture may prove to be problematic if the firm was ever required to comply with 
localization demands, and refusal to comply could result in fines or litigation that new firms may 
not be able to facilitate. New firms could implement default end-to-end encryption, making 
compliance to U.S. government surveillance requests nearly impossible to accommodate. 
However, unilateral technical affordance methods can potentially escalate the demands of the 
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government, forcing firms into a standoff akin to Apple and the FBI. A standoff may necessitate 
defense in court where, again, new firms likely will not have the resources for prolonged 
litigation. If a new firm were to defend their privacy stance in court, failed litigation would not 
only completely upend the privacy protections the firms implemented to resist surveillance, but 
the precedent set in a loss could also threaten the entire business ecosystem. Even if a new firm 
avoided an escalated standoff with the U.S. government, operating as a privacy focused service 
where the firm has no access to decryption keys may attract the bad actors that U.S. government 
surveillance is targeting. A new firm may not be able to withstand public branding as a safe 
harbor for bad actors the same way the FBI attempted to frame the Apple debate over the San 
Bernardino shooting. 
 
The only guaranteed method to resist surveillance would be to limit the collection and 
retention of personal data assets as much a new firm’s business allows. If the data is not 
available to either the firm or the government there would be no opportunity for non-
compliance with data protection laws or surveillance requests, but that option may not be 
realistic. Opting out of advertising based revenue models may inhibit user acquisition and 
diminish the ability of firms to establish their own network effects. Without strong network 
effects, new firms may not be able to retain users during potential scandals. The disadvantaged 
position of new firms to resist U.S. government surveillance, no matter the chosen method, 
further emphasizes the position of the Top Firms who established their dominance in a 
previously unregulated industry. The only choice new firms have may be to prioritize growth at 
all costs to build their own network effects. If they aren’t capable of doing that, they won’t be 
able to compete with the Top Firms regardless of U.S. government surveillance.   
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Chapter V. Discussion 
 
A. Utility of Affordance Theory 
 
Calo’s initial application of Affordance Theory was to measure the ability of U.S. citizens to 
resist government surveillance. His findings demonstrated that individuals were systematically 
disadvantaged and that the technology firms would be better equipped to resist surveillance. 
This thesis applied Calo’s Affordance Theory to U.S.-based technology firms to test if firms were 
actually better equipped, but with some modifications. Calo’s research used the conceptual 
findings of other research to support his conclusions. This thesis applied Affordance Theory to 
the actual surveillance resistance that firms engaged in following the Snowden disclosures. Calo 
also treated U.S. citizens as a singular being with the same motivations and limitations. This 
thesis focused on four individual firms to make distinctions between firms and to observe how 
those differences affected the ability of each firm to resist surveillance. The four firms chosen 
were globally market dominant firms because the assumption made by Calo is that the influence 
and resources of firms would better equip them to resist surveillance. 
 
While this thesis focused on firms, the findings have impacts on all stakeholders within the 
business environment. Generally, U.S.-based platform technology firms have benefitted from 
little to no regulation and the ability to build dominant businesses by exploiting personal data 
assets. But what built these companies is proving to be their greatest threat. The mass data 
collection of firms has made them targets for surveillance and regulation. Both government 
surveillance and surveillance capitalism have forced countries around the world to establish 
borders in the previously open internet that facilitated these firms’ growth. The firms with 
business models reliant on targeted advertising are at even greater risk. Targeted advertising 
business models incentivize the exact opposite behaviors required by data protection laws 
around the world. Are these firms prepared to adjust if data protection diminished the viability 
of an ad model? Are users willing to pay for these services using a subscription model, and can 
the firms sustain the revenue per user and growth rates as the current ad model provides? Firms 
need to self-regulate and make the ad model worthwhile for users to exchange data. More user 
control over the what data is collected and what ads are displayed may make the exchange more 
palatable for users. If users help cultivate the ads they are shown, firms may not have to collect 
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such endless amounts of data to obtain the same insights as the actual user’s contributions. 
Many of these concerns and recommendations apply to shareholders. 
 
Users should be careful as well. Many of the services the Top Firms provide are free of 
charge on the ad based model. If privacy protections begin to diminish the value of ad based 
models, users may get a lesser version of what they had and may have to adjust to a subscription 
model. This is not meant to discourage calls for privacy. Users should understand that there will 
be tradeoffs. 
 
With the exception of the CLOUD Act, the U.S. government appears committed to 
surveillance with little long term outlook for the future of data protection. This thesis has 
covered all the methods that firms engage in to limit the fallout of U.S. government surveillance. 
It is understood that the data collected by firms is an invaluable surveillance resource. However, 
if non-U.S. governments respond with stronger data protection laws or protectionist policies, it 
begins to diminish the value of the privileged access the U.S. government obtains from U.S.-
based firms. 
 
Dividing the methods of surveillance into four separate affordances allowed for initial clarity 
and review, but when applied to the practical methods used by firms, it became clear that the 
affordances were dependent on one another, thus making it more difficult to rate the efficacy of 
each affordance separately. Also, the outcomes of each method opened up the possibility for 
reverberations that could reframe whether an outcome was desirable or undesirable. An 
example of this is the enactment of the CLOUD Act. The CLOUD Act rendered the Microsoft 
Supreme Court litigation moot, making it difficult to determine if litigation was successful. The 
final bill was built on years of lobbying previous bills that were only partially incorporated. 
Firms hailed the bill as privacy protective but privacy advocates strongly disagreed. The bill is 
highly dependent on the executive branch establishing bilateral agreements that are yet to be 
initiated. How should Microsoft’s use of the legal affordance be rated? Should the CLOUD Act’s 
passage be considered when making that determination? What if the executive branch does not 
establish bilateral agreements with any new governments? All of this uncertainty and 
interdependence made it difficult to rate affordances as simply positive or negative. 
 
Calo’s use of Affordance Theory is not a preferred tool for measuring a firm’s ability to resist 
surveillance. Bucketing and rating methods of resistance based on the existing affordance types 
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and the application of a binary rating is too restrictive. A better methodology would be to map 
emergence feedback within complex adaptive systems, accounting for all relevant stakeholders. 
It must include reverberations throughout nested affordances resulting from the initial action of 
individual agents. In a more comprehensive system, Microsoft’s challenge of the Ireland warrant 
through litigation would be tracked, not only as the challenge progressed to higher courts, but 
also to lobbying and congressional hearings that called for legislative solutions to prevent 
undesirable legal outcomes that could not consider multiple stakeholders. Alternatives to 
Affordance Theory must be able to account for changes over time and the impact of outcomes 
across several resistance methods. 
 
B. Firms as Corporate Avatars 
 
The results of this thesis were also intended to measure the ability of firms to act as 
corporate avatars. Like Calo, Cover’s perception was that citizens needed firms to protect their 
privacy because of systematic limitations applied to them individually as citizens, but Cover was 
skeptical that firms would serve effectively in this capacity. Cover believed that firms would put 
the needs of the business ahead of the privacy needs of individuals. So, while using Affordance 
Theory to measure the ability of firms to resist surveillance, this thesis also measured firms as 
corporate avatars when resisting surveillance. Often, the ability of a firm to resist surveillance 
was heavily influenced by the degree to which the firm was motivated or limited by business 
needs. The motivation to prevent protectionism and localization that threatened cross-border 
data flows may have motivated firms to resist surveillance of data stored outside of the United 
States. This would be an example of business needs making firms more effective at resisting 
surveillance. Another example is the use of end-to-end encryption by firms. This privacy 
technique would make firms very effective at resisting surveillance, but implementation 
negatively impacts the ability of firms to exploit personal data for surveillance capitalism. This 
would be an example of business needs limiting the ability of firms to resist surveillance. 
 
The use of corporate avatar theory had been applied to test the ability and willingness of 
firms to serve as protectors of individual privacy, but rating firms as corporate avatars was more 
difficult than expected. At times, the motivations of firms can be unclear since there aren’t 
explicit statements by firms that explain motivations. In those instances, rating a firm based on 
levels of self-interest becomes highly speculative. Other complications arose when firms were 
seemingly motivated by business needs, but the outcome was also desirable for individual 
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citizens. How should a firm be measured as a corporate avatar when the ability to resist 
surveillance is a byproduct of the firm protecting its own interests? Should a firm’s capacity as a 
corporate avatar be determined by the outcome of their actions or the motivation for resisting 
surveillance? Does the outcome determine if a firm is a corporate avatar or does the motivation? 
A better method for measuring firms as corporate avatars would be a spectrum or scale rather 
than a binary choice between corporate avatar and not corporate avatar. Ideally a new 
mechanism could weigh outcome and motivation for an advanced measurement of firms as 
corporate avatars. 
 
C. Contributions to Remaining Existing Literature 
 
Ryan Calo’s application of Affordance Theory and Avidan Cover’s concept of the corporate 
avatar were both integral aspects of the methodology of this thesis. However, this thesis couples 
and augments other existing literature covering technology firm involvement with U.S. 
government surveillance. Priya Kumar asserted that inclusion of the firms named in the 
Snowden disclosures was critical to ongoing public debate over U.S. government surveillance 
(Kumar 2017, 69). The naming of Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft as complicit 
participants in the disclosures contributed to them being the Top Firms in this thesis. Kumar 
analyzed the changes within firms’ privacy policies to illustrate the continued growth of 
surveillance capitalism while firms were actively involved in PRISM surveillance. Her analysis 
focused on a period covering the firms’ participation in PRISM up to the Snowden disclosures in 
2013, and ended with a call to action to further scrutinize the involvement of PRISM associated 
firms (Kumar 2017). Although the Top Firms have resisted U.S. government surveillance since 
the disclosures, this thesis found that resistance has been least impactful as it pertains to 
PRISM. The political affordance failed to reign in PRISM surveillance. The reauthorization of 
FISA Section 702, which is the authorizing legislation for PRISM, expanded the capabilities of 
National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance and did not limit access to the collected data by 
other agencies. The value of surveillance capitalism has not waned following the period covered 
by Kumar’s analysis. The Top Firms have exhibited more aggressive data collection behaviors 
through deceptive practices seen in the technical affordance, including the merging of large 
datasets that were previously said to be kept separate and the promotion of privacy focused 
software that monitors and collects user activity. The methods of resistance executed via the 
technical affordance were highly influenced by surveillance capitalism. The Top Firms 
implemented in-transit encryption that limited the value of the NSA’s UPSTREAM surveillance 
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program. However, use of end-to-end encryption, which would have limited the value of PRISM, 
was used sparingly. By continuing the inclusion of the Top Firms in discussions of U.S. 
government surveillance, this thesis augments Kumar’s findings only to determine that the 
actions of the Top Firms have had little impact on their continued involvement in PRISM 
surveillance, years after being named in the Snowden disclosures. 
 
Just as this thesis progressed Kumar’s emphasis on the importance of technology firms in 
surveillance conversations, so did Alan Z. Rozenshtein’s research on the ability of technology 
firms to resist surveillance as “surveillance intermediaries” (Rozenshtein 2018, 107). On the 
surface, his research and this thesis have commonalities. His analysis of litigiousness, technical 
unilateralism, and policy mobilization are comparable to this thesis’ analysis of legal, technical, 
and political affordances (122-149). The divergence with Rozenshtein’s research is in the 
objectives of the underlying analysis. Rozenshtein explored the role of surveillance 
intermediaries in the surveillance environment whereas this thesis explored the role of the Top 
Firms in the business environment. Rozenshtein used his analysis to discuss two conceptual and 
ideological conversations. First was the concept of the “surveillance separation of powers” 
demonstrating how the resistance of surveillance intermediaries forced intragovernmental 
checks on executive branch surveillance operations (Rozenshtein 2018, 149-163). Second was 
the use of a new framework to determine how societal appetites for surveillance impact policy 
with consideration of societal tradeoffs (Rozenshtein 2018, 163-172). This thesis explored 
techniques of surveillance resistance in more depth and with consideration of emergence and 
feedback stemming from the Top Firms’ actions throughout their business ecosystem and 
environment. For example, Rozenshtein briefly addresses localization and surveillance 
capitalism, which were both major aspects of this thesis. He mentions that localization could be 
an unintended consequence of litigation (Rozenshtein 2018, 169) and how different surveillance 
capitalist business models impact the implementation of encryption between firms (Rozenshtein 
2018, 138). This thesis examined both of those topics in more granularity. The risk of 
localization influenced how firms advocated for legislation in congressional hearings and 
adversely impacted firms differently based on their network architecture. The variation of 
surveillance capitalist business models not only impacted their use of end-to-end encryption, 
but also the use of anonymization techniques and the aggressive lengths firms employed in a 
data collection arms race. Surveillance capitalism also served as an undercurrent throughout 
this thesis when evaluating the capacity of firms as corporate avatars. While Rozenshtein kept 
resistance techniques more compartmentalized, this thesis explored how actions or outcomes 
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within one affordance had downstream effects to other affordance methods. For example, 
Rozenshtein discussed the U.S. Supreme Court case Microsoft v. U.S. (130) but did not explore 
its relation to the legislative solutions like the International Communications Privacy Act (ICPA) 
or the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act. However, it is worth mentioning 
that the CLOUD Act was not introduced until a month after Rozenshtein’s article was published. 
This significant event, which rendered the Microsoft v. U.S. case moot once enacted, illustrates 
how just a few months of time can impact analysis of a dynamic topic like surveillance 
resistance. Furthermore, this dynamism reinforces the importance of continued research that 
contributes to and advances conversations covering the intersection of public and private sector 
surveillance. 
 
D. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
A major complication when comparing the ability of firms to resist surveillance was the 
difference in their business models. The diversity allowed for the exploration of how those 
differences influenced decision making, but comparing a social media network to a hardware 
company and a search engine complicates the comparisons between firms of how they use data. 
Google collects and utilizes search data to improve results specific to a user over time whereas 
Apple collects and aggregates how many users are using a function in iOS to make broad 
improvements to that function. By nature of the business, Apple is better equipped to resist 
surveillance and serve as a corporate avatar. 
 
The Top Firms chosen for this thesis had to meet certain guidelines. The firms needed to be 
dominant so that they were similarly well resourced to resist surveillance, were multinational 
and subject to increasingly common data protection laws, and would have received enough 
requests to have a history in challenging them. In addition, all four Top Firms were named in 
Snowden’s disclosures, raising the stakes for these firms to resist surveillance. Without having to 
consider a comparable history with U.S. government surveillance, the Top Firms could have 
included firms that were excluded from this thesis. Of note, there is an emerging business 
feature that is common among current dominant firms: digital assistants. Like search and social 
features, digital assistants are designed to be curated to the user necessitating a mass amount of 
data to fuel machine learning that improves both the user’s assistant and every assistant at the 
same time. All of the digital assistants interact with users via a live mic that waits for a command 
word. Because four dominant firms are competing in a single space that contributes to network 
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effects and walled gardens, the firms are highly incentivized to engage users both to establish 
assistant loyalty and to collect as much data as possible to iterate and make the assistant better 
than that of the other three firms. As digital assistants complete more tasks for users, the data 
collected will almost certainly be attractive for U.S government surveillance. If so, measuring 
how firms handle privacy and business needs could be much more informative when all four 
firms are competing in the same highly competitive space. 
 
As seen in the market affordance analysis, the public salience of both public and private 
sector surveillance becomes more pronounced as privacy scandals unfold. Privacy is continually 
threatened by both the U.S. government and U.S-based firms leaving the public dissatisfied with 
their lack of control over their own personal information. When Apple fights the FBI over 
encryption or Congress holds public hearings over Facebook data governance, the public is left 
standing on the sidelines as mere observers while their privacy rights are debated in a public 
forum. Future research could explore how public dissatisfaction influenced Rozenshtein’s 
framework used to measure perceptions of societal surveillance tradeoffs and whether the 
resulting intragovernmental checks truly reflect changes in societal perception of both U.S. 
government surveillance and surveillance capitalism. Presumably there will be more scandals 
implicating both types of surveillance. It will be fascinating to see if continued scandals and a 
public desire for more oversight and accountability lead to the emergence of privacy and 
surveillance as deciding factors in upcoming midterm and presidential elections.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 
Since the Snowden disclosures in 2013, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft have 
continued to resist U.S. government surveillance to restore user trust and limit protectionist 
policies around the world. Existing literature not only presumed that technology firms would be 
more effective at resisting surveillance than individual citizens, but that firms also were 
obligated to resist surveillance on behalf of citizens. Using Affordance Theory, this thesis 
measured the ability of these firms to resist surveillance by focusing on four dominant firms and 
evaluating the actual measures these firms used to resist surveillance post-Snowden rather than 
generalized concepts. 
 
The results present a complicated picture. The Top Firms had mixed results resisting 
surveillance despite being well resourced and influential. Not only were there variances between 
firms and between affordances, but even within a single affordance for an individual firm. The 
ability of firms to resist surveillance was heavily influenced by the firm’s business model. 
Existing literature assumed that if a firm prioritized business needs above individual privacy, 
the result would be an undesired outcome for individuals. But the drive to protect foreign 
markets made firms more effective and the need to preserve access to mass collected user data 
made firms less effective. The results revealed the complexities of surveillance resistance. Firms 
are certainly more equipped to resist surveillance than individual citizens, but their ability to 
resist surveillance is by no means guaranteed and a firm’s capacity as a corporate avatar is more 
dynamic than previous literature would suggest. 
 
Future research would benefit from a framework that is less structured and can be 
mapped over time. By observing the limitations of this paper’s application of Affordance Theory, 
a new framework can be advanced that measures not only if firms are successful in resisting 
surveillance, but also the dynamics of how, when, and why they choose to resist surveillance. 
Once a more complex understanding of firms’ surveillance resistance is established, the findings 
could be applied to the ideological and conceptual inquires of researchers like Rozenshtein. A 
deeper understanding of firm dynamics within the business environment could provide more 
informed insight into how firms influence the surveillance environment, particularly when 
considering the intragovernmental dynamics of political turnover and shifting public 
perceptions of both public and private sector surveillance. 
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